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Taxonomy of the Snowden Disclosures 
Margaret Hu∗ 
Abstract 
This brief Essay offers a proposed taxonomy of the Snowden 
Disclosures. An informed discussion on the legality and constitutionality of 
the emerging cybersurveillance and mass dataveillance programs revealed 
by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden necessitates the furtherance of 
cybersurveillance aptitude. This Essay contends, therefore, that a detailed 
examination of the Snowden disclosures requires not just a careful inquiry 
into the legal and constitutional framework that guides the oversight of 
these programs. A close interrogation also requires a careful inquiry into 
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the big data architecture that guides them. This inquiry includes 
examining the underlying theories of data science and the rationales of big 
data-driven policymaking that may drive the expansion of big data 
cybersurveillance. These technological, theoretical, and policymaking 
movements are occurring within what has been termed by scholars as the 
National Surveillance State. Better understanding the manner in which 
intelligence gathering may be shifting away from small data surveillance 
methods and toward the adoption of big data cybersurveillance methods—
and assessing the efficacy of this shift—can factually ground future 
debates on how best to constrain comprehensive and ubiquitous 
surveillance technologies at the dawn of the National Surveillance State. 
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I. Introduction 
This brief Essay offers a proposed taxonomy of the Snowden disclosures1 
to help situate these programs within the theory of the “National 
                                                                                                                  
 1. See generally GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, 
AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014) (discussing in detail the history of the Snowden 
disclosures). For more information, see Documents, GLENN GREENWALD 
http://glenngreenwald.net/#BookDocuments (last visited Nov. 4, 2015) (providing further 
information on the disclosures in No Place To Hide) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). See also Jon L. Mills, The Future of Privacy in the Surveillance Age, in 
AFTER SNOWDEN: PRIVACY, SECRECY, AND SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 191 (Ronald 
Goldfarb ed., 2016) (discussing the Snowden disclosures). 
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Surveillance State.”2 An informed discussion on the legality and 
constitutionality of the emerging cybersurveillance3 and mass dataveillance4 
programs revealed by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden necessitates 
the furtherance of cybersurveillance aptitude. Specifically, a technological 
grounding of these emerging surveillance methods is needed to assess 
                                                                                                                  
 2. See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. 
L. REV. 1, 12 (2008) (explaining that the National Surveillance State is a “rich” place for 
the government to obtain information); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes 
of Constitutional Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 520–21 (2006) (discussing the importance of the National 
Surveillance State in “American constitutionalism” and how the National Surveillance 
State is identified by an increase of resources dedicated to technology and promoting 
domestic security); see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING 
OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 5 (2014) [hereinafter PODESTA REPORT], https://www. 
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf (“[D]ata 
collection and analysis is being conducted at a velocity that is increasingly approaching 
real time, which means there is a growing potential for big data analytics to have an 
immediate effect on a person’s surrounding environment or decisions being made about his 
or her life.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 209 (2006) (describing 
cybersurveillance or “digital surveillance” as “the process by which some form of human 
activity is analyzed by a computer according to some specified rule. . . . [T]he critical 
feature in each [case of surveillance] is that a computer is sorting data for some follow-up 
review by some human”). Several important works have been published in recent years, 
shedding light on mass surveillance technologies, and the policy and programmatic 
framework of cybersurveillance and covert intelligence gathering. See generally, e.g., 
PRIVACY AND POWER: A TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE IN THE SHADOW OF THE NSA-AFFAIR 
(Russell A. Miller ed.) (forthcoming); JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A QUEST FOR 
PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND FREEDOM IN A WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE 17–18 (2014); 
SHANE HARRIS, @WAR: THE RISE OF THE MILITARY-INTERNET COMPLEX (2014); JOHN GILLIOM 
& TORIN MONAHAN, SUPERVISION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY (2013); 
SIMON CHESTERMAN, ONE NATION UNDER SURVEILLANCE: A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT TO 
DEFEND FREEDOM WITHOUT SACRIFICING LIBERTY (2011); DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, 
TOP SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE NEW AMERICAN SECURITY STATE (2011); SHANE 
HARRIS, THE WATCHERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S SURVEILLANCE STATE (2010); ROBERT 
O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE (2006); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING 
SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANXIOUS AGE (2004). 
 4. Roger Clarke is attributed with introducing the term “dataveillance.” See Roger A. 
Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, 31 COMM. ACM 498, 499 (1988) 
(describing dataveillance as the systematic monitoring or investigation of people’s actions, 
activities, or communications through the application of information technology); see also 
DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 16 (2007) (“Being much cheaper than 
direct physical or electronic surveillance [dataveillance] enables the watching of more 
people or populations, because economic constraints to surveillance are reduced. 
Dataveillance also automates surveillance. Classically, government bureaucracies have 
been most interested in gathering such data . . . .”). 
1682 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1679 (2015) 
reasonableness in the Fourth Amendment analysis5 and to assess efficacy 
and legality under various statutory provisions guiding restrictions on 
intelligence gathering activities.6 
                                                                                                                  
 5. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
 6. Scholars and experts have focused careful attention on the legal implications of 
the mass surveillance activities of the NSA and the intelligence community in work both 
preceding and following the disclosures of former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. See, 
generally, William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles in 
Haystacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1633 (2010) (arguing that FISA has become too rigid to 
adapt to evolving threats and provide speedy surveillance); Anjali S. Dalal, Shadow 
Administrative Constitutionalism and the Creation of Surveillance Culture, 2014 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 59 (2014) (arguing that government agencies have added to the growth of the 
culture of surveillance by shifting the bounds of acceptable behavior); Laura K. Donohue, 
Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 757 (2014) (providing the basis for Congress passing FISA and arguing that the 
current bulk collection program violates this Act); Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the 
Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117 
(2015) (tracing the history of surveillance programs in the United States and exploring the 
constitutionality of Section 702 of FISA); Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The 
Conforming Effect: First Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 
49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465 (2015) (arguing that the rise of surveillance has certain effects that 
implicate the theories behind the First Amendment); Orin S. Kerr, A Rule of Lenity for 
National Security Surveillance Law, 100 VA. L. REV. 1513 (2014) (arguing that Congress 
should adopt a rule of lenity that would favor the citizen over the State in interpreting 
surveillance statutes); Peter Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in 
Metadata and Foreign Content Collection After Snowden, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2014) 
(arguing that the programs disclosed by Snowden are legal but calling for greater 
transparency and accountability following Snowden’s disclosures); Paul Ohm, Electronic 
Surveillance Law and the Intra-Agency Separation of Powers, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 269 (2012) 
(conducting an institutional analysis of electronic surveillance by arguing for the use of an 
internal separation of powers); Nathan A. Sales, Domesticating Programmatic 
Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the NSA Controversy, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 523 
(2014) (exploring the legality of NSA surveillance programs); Margo Schlanger, 
Intelligence Realism and the National Security Agency’s Civil Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L 
SEC. J. 112 (2015) (arguing that the NSA’s mentality in compliance terms is attributable to 
intelligence legalism); Christopher Slobogin, Cause to Believe What? The Importance of 
Defining a Search’s Object—Or, How the ABA Would Analyze the NSA Metadata 
Surveillance Program, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 725 (2014) (exploring how the demise of a search’s 
object can raise Fourth Amendment implications both generally and in the context with 
the NSA’s information-gathering program); Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, 
Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721 (2014) 
(arguing for the possibility of applying administrative law principles to law principles by 
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Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson define the National Surveillance 
State as being “characterized by a significant increase in government 
investments in technology and government bureaucracies devoted to 
promoting domestic security and (as its name implies) gathering 
intelligence and surveillance using all of the devices that the digital 
revolution allows.”7 The National Surveillance State, like the 
administrative state, is largely bureaucratized.8 Thus, through 
bureaucratized decision making that may bypass traditional 
constitutional protections,9 the National Surveillance State harnesses the 
technologies of big data10 and the Information Society, and integrates 
                                                                                                                  
relying on the rise of the surveillance state); Peter P. Swire, Privacy  and Information 
Sharing in the War on Terrorism, 51 VILL. L. REV. 951 (2006) (arguing that information 
sharing is critical and exploring the implications of mass information sharing); Omer 
Tene, A New Harm Matrix for Cybersecurity Surveillance, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 391 (2014) 
(proposing parameters for analysis of the privacy impact of communications monitoring 
programs); Patrick Toomey & Brett Max Kaufman, The Notice Paradox: Secret 
Surveillance, Criminal Defendants, & the Right to Notice, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 843 
(2014) (arguing that as the rise of the surveillance state continues, notice, an essential 
restrain on illegal searches, is disappearing); Stephen I. Vladeck, Big Data Before and 
After Snowden, 7 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 333 (2014) (comparing a panel discussion on big 
data before Snowden’s disclosures and hypothesizing how the discussion would unfold 
after the disclosures); Stephen I. Vladeck, Standing and Secret Surveillance, 10 I/S J.L. & 
POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 551 (2014) (exploring the Supreme Court’s response to secret 
surveillance programs); John Yoo, The Legality of the National Security Agency’s Bulk 
Data Surveillance Programs, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 901 (2014) (arguing that the 
current NSA surveillance programs do not violate the Fourth Amendment).  
 7. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 2, at 520–21. 
 8. See Balkin, supra note 2, at 4 (“The National Surveillance State is a permanent 
feature of governance, and will become as ubiquitous in time as the familiar devices of the 
regulatory and welfare states.”). 
 9. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 2, at 525–26 (“If the information gleaned from 
the government’s national security wing is transferred over to its law enforcement 
wing . . . law enforcement will be transformed into increasing surveillance of ordinary 
Americans to prevent not only the most serious threats to national security, but also 
everyday crimes . . . .”); Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Erik Luna, Digital Innocence, 99 CORNELL 
L. REV. 981, 986 (2014) (explaining the potential for exoneration through the use of mass 
data collection to prevent and correct wrongful criminal convictions). 
 10. “Big data” is difficult to define, as it is a newly evolving field, and the technologies 
that it encompasses are evolving rapidly as well. See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1920–21 (2013) (“‘Big Data’ is . . . a technology and a process. The 
technology is a configuration of information-processing hardware capable of sifting, 
sorting, and interrogating vast quantities of data . . . . The process involves mining the 
data for patterns, distilling the patterns into predictive analytics, and applying the 
analytics to new data.”). Multiple authors have addressed the characteristics of “big data” 
and the challenges posed by big data technologies. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards & Jonathan 
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surveillance into day-to-day governance activities.11 This governance is 
often justified by ex ante and pre-crime objectives—for example, the need 
to prevent perceived criminal and terroristic threats.12 
Balkin and Levinson have identified the National Surveillance State 
as an important concern of American constitutionalism that uniquely 
impacts core democratic principles.13 Similarly, Glenn Greenwald and 
Laura Poitras—who enjoy sole possession of the full Snowden archives14—
explain that the Snowden disclosures profoundly implicate questions of 
                                                                                                                  
H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 394 n.3 (2014) (discussing the 
relevance of IT Glossary: Big Data, GARTNER, http://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/big-data/ 
(last visited May 11, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)); id. (citing 
the original “3-V” big data report, Doug Laney, 3D Data Management: Controlling Data 
Volume, Velocity, and Variety, GARTNER (Feb. 6, 2001), blogs.gartner.com/doug-
laney/files/2012/01/ad949-3D-Data-Management-Controlling-Data-Volume-Velocity-and-
Variety.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2015) (arguing that current business conditions are 
giving rise to more formalized approaches to data management principles) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review)). See generally PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC 
GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014) (defining and 
discussing the “big data” phenomenon); JULES J. BERMAN, PRINCIPLES OF BIG DATA: 
PREPARING, SHARING, AND ANALYZING COMPLEX INFORMATION (2013) (same); Danah Boyd & 
Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a Cultural, Technological, 
and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 662 (2012) (same); ROB KITCHIN, THE 
DATA REVOLUTION: BIG DATA, OPEN DATA, DATA INFRASTRUCTURES & THEIR CONSEQUENCES 
(2014) (same); VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION 
THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (2013) (same).  
 11. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 2, at 523 (explaining that “information [is] 
ever more valuable to governments; this causes governments to invest even more heavily 
in the collection, storage, and collation of data”). 
 12. See id. at 526 (“[T]he government will be tempted to move increasingly from 
investigation and arrest after crimes occur to surveillance, prevention, and interception 
before crimes occur.”); see also Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of 
Targeted, Noncustodial Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 331 (2014) (explaining that 
precrime “restrictions share common features: they are targeted at particular individuals, 
entities, or categories of individuals; they impose noncustodial restrictions; and they are 
preventive in both purpose and effect”); David Cole, The Difference Prevention Makes: 
Regulating Preventive Justice, CRIM. & PHIL. (Mar. 25, 2014), http://link.springer.com/ 
article/10.1007/s11572-013-9289-7/fulltext.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2015) (characterizing 
“the post-9/11 full-scale adoption of a paradigm of prevention” as “a sea change”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 13. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 2, at 520 (“One of the most important 
developments in American constitutionalism is the gradual transformation of the United 
States into a National Surveillance State.”). 
 14. See GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 7–89 (discussing in detail the history of the 
Snowden disclosures, including how and why Snowden invited Greenwald and Poitras to 
possess and disseminate the Snowden files). 
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democratic governance.15 It is within this much larger frame of discussion 
that the importance of the Snowden disclosures can be better understood 
and appreciated.16 However, this appreciation is inadequate so long as the 
Snowden disclosures are referred to in the abstract.17 
From June 5, 2013, until the present,18 hundreds of formerly covert 
programs have been revealed to the public through the disclosures of 
                                                                                                                  
 15. See id. at 6 (“[Snowden] has made it clear, with these disclosures, that we stand 
at a historic crossroads. Will the digital age usher in the individual liberation and political 
freedoms that the Internet is uniquely capable of unleashing? Or will it bring about a 
system of omnipresent monitoring and control . . . ?”); CITIZENFOUR (Praxis Films 2014) 
(featuring interviews with Snowden); Peter Maass, The Intercept’s Laura Poitras Wins 
Academy Award for ‘Citizenfour’, THE INTERCEPT (Feb. 22, 2015), https://firstlook.org/the 
intercept/2015/02/22/poitras-wins-oscar-for-citizenfour/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2015) (“‘The 
disclosures that Edward Snowden revealed don’t only expose a threat to our privacy but to 
our democracy itself,’ Poitras said in her acceptance speech [at the 87th Academy Awards, 
immediately after Poitras received the Oscar for Best Documentary Feature for directing 
Citizenfour].”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); RACHEL LEVINSON-
WALDMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES WITH AMERICANS’ 
DATA 9 (2013) (“The collection and retention of non-criminal information about Americans 
for law enforcement and national security purposes poses profound challenges to our 
democracy and our liberties.”); see also Balkin & Levinson, supra note 2, at 520 (“One of 
the most important developments in American constitutionalism is the gradual 
transformation of the United States into a National Surveillance State.”). 
 16. See GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 169 (“[Snowden’s revelations] triggered an 
intense, sustained worldwide debate precisely because the surveillance poses such a grave 
threat to democratic governance.”). 
 17. See id. at 208–09 (“While the government, via surveillance, knows more and more 
about what its citizens are doing, its citizens know less and less about what their 
government is doing, shielding as it is by a wall of secrecy.”). 
 18. The Snowden disclosures were launched on June 5, 2013, and June 6, 2013, by 
Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras, respectively, the only two individuals who possess 
the full Snowden archives. The first Snowden disclosure on the NSA’s bulk telephony 
metadata collection program was revealed by Greenwald in The Guardian; the second 
Snowden disclosure on the NSA’s PRISM program was revealed by Barton Gellman and 
Laura Poitras in The Washington Post. See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone 
Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order 
(last visited Sept. 6, 2015) (“The National Security Agency is currently collecting the 
telephone records of millions of US customers of Verizon, one of America’s largest telecoms 
providers, under a top secret court order issued in April.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining 
Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-
us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970cc 
b04497_story.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2015) (“The National Security Agency and the 
FBI are tapping directly into the central servers of nine leading U.S. Internet companies, 
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National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden.19 As the 
disclosures continue to be revealed by various news organizations, the full 
scope of the revelations is, as of yet, still unknown.20 To help grapple with 
the specific contours of the technological, scientific, theoretical, and policy 
developments that animate the National Surveillance State, this Essay 
offers an Appendix of several hundred of the programs that now comprise 
what we refer to collectively and abstractly in the public discourse as “the 
Snowden disclosures” or “the Snowden revelations.”21 
As part of the Symposium, Cybersurveillance in the Post-Snowden 
Age, this taxonomical effort relies exclusively upon publicly available 
sources. The public has been granted access to more classified documents 
relating to covert intelligence activities than ever before by virtue of the 
Snowden disclosures, media and investigative reports, and national 
security revelations through other intelligence sources. Nonetheless, this 
piece and proposed taxonomy might be considered best as a thought 
experiment, as cybersurveillance research is necessarily constrained in its 
conclusions and restricted to the information available, which is, of 
course, incomplete due the covert nature of the programs. 
The reader should be careful to note the age of this information. The 
Appendix does not detail the NSA’s current capacities, but, rather, the 
capacities when Snowden went public. Many of the Snowden documents 
reference programs and their status as of 2010 to 2012. This Appendix 
also does not purport to be a comprehensive list of all of the Snowden 
disclosures. Neither should the categories offered here be viewed as 
definitive and inflexible classifications. The criteria used for inclusion in 
one category over another was based upon a certain degree of speculation, 
depending upon the information available, and in many instances, it 
appeared that a program could fall within more than one category.  
Rather, this work is a good faith attempt to compile the documents 
that have been made available in the aftermath of the Snowden 
disclosures from June 2013 until January 2015, and to find a method to 
classify the hundreds of individualized programs included within these 
                                                                                                                  
extracting audio and video chats, photographs, e-mails, documents, and connection logs 
that enable analysts to track foreign targets, according to a top-secret document obtained 
by The Washington Post.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 19. See Toomey & Kaufman, supra note 6, at 844 (describing the amount of NSA 
disclosures as a “cascade” of information). 
 20. See GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 53 (describing Snowden’s preference to publish 
the leaked documents “journalistically” rather than in bulk to allow the public to process 
the information in a more efficient way). 
 21. Infra App. at 45. 
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documents. This descriptive effort serves longer-term research aims, 
including future scholarship on the legality and constitutionality of the 
Snowden disclosures. For this Essay, however, the ambition is more 
modest: an attempt to take stock of the current Snowden disclosures 
through the measure of an initial categorical evaluation and a proposed 
system of classification, even if such an effort may be incomplete or 
speculative at this juncture. 
Each part of the Essay briefly describes the system of classification 
used to categorize the Snowden disclosures that have been included in the 
Appendix. The proposed system of classification articulated here draws 
heavily upon Greenwald’s description of cybersurveillance architecture as 
set forth in No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. 
Surveillance State. The specific documents from the Snowden disclosures 
as revealed by Greenwald, Poitras, and others, have been examined for 
how best to give form to what was previously formless: the technological 
and e-programmatic structure of the covert intelligence activities of the 
National Surveillance State. David Cole, in reviewing Greenwald’s book, 
notes that: “In one remarkable [NSA] slide presented at a 2011 meeting of 
five nations’ intelligence agencies and revealed here for the first time, the 
NSA described its ‘collection posture’ as ‘Collect it All,’ ‘Process it All,’ 
‘Exploit it All,’ ‘Partner it All,’ ‘Sniff it All’ and, ultimately, ‘Know it All.’”22  
This Essay proceeds in five parts. The taxonomy offered below is an 
attempt to categorize the programs revealed by the Snowden disclosures 
into one of five categories: Part II briefly describes collection programs 
(“Collect It All”); Part III briefly describes processing programs (“Process 
It All”); Part IV briefly describes attack programs (“Exploit It All”); Part V 
briefly describes isolation programs (“Sniff It All”); and Part VI briefly 
describes database programs (“Partner It All” and “Know It All”). Each 
type of program is defined in more detail in the discussion below. In the 
Appendix, some programs are listed as “Unknown” where there is 
insufficient information to classify the program.  
Through this proposed taxonomy of the Snowden disclosures, the 
research effort of this Essay strives to illustrate how we are witnessing a 
historically significant transition from small data surveillance methods to 
                                                                                                                  
 22. David Cole, ‘No Place to Hide’ by Glenn Greenwald, on the NSA’s Sweeping Efforts 
to ‘Know It All’, WASH. POST (May 12, 2014) https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/no-
place-to-hide-by-glenn-greenwald-on-the-nsas-sweeping-efforts-to-know-it-all/2014/05/12/d 
fa45dee-d628-11e3-8a78-8fe50322a72c_story.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2015) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 97 (citing an NSA 
slide from Snowden disclosures titled, “New Collection Posture,” quoting NSA data 
collection procedure as “Collect It All”).  
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big data cybersurveillance methods.23 The big data revolution is not only 
technological in nature, but, as several experts have observed, is an 
epistemological and ontological revolution as well.24 The manner in which 
big data impacts philosophies of knowledge acquisition and human 
perception necessarily impacts government decisionmaking and 
bureaucratized protocols.25 As the government increasingly capitalizes on 
big data tools, the revolution of big data governance has also led to a 
revolution in contemporary cybersurveillance policies and practices, as 
can be witnessed by the Snowden disclosures. The Essay concludes that, 
when evaluating the propriety of the deployment of big data 
cybersurveillance tools by the Intelligence Community, special attention 
must be placed on big data. Recognizing the technological significance of 
big data as a scientific, theoretical, and philosophical axis underlying the 
                                                                                                                  
 23. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 
PEPP. L. REV. 773, 803–05 (2015) (following the Snowden disclosures, at least one expert 
has asserted that the NSA is attempting to merge big data tools with small data tools); 
Kate Crawford, The Anxieties of Big Data, NEW INQUIRY (May 30, 2014), 
http://thenewinquiry.com/essays/the-anxieties-of-big-data/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2015) 
[A Squeaky Dolphin PowerPoint slide from the Snowden disclosures] outlines 
an expansionist program to bring big data together with the more traditional 
approaches of the social and humanistic sciences: the worlds of small 
data. . . . [I]t is all about supplementing [big] data analysis with broader 
sociocultural tools . . . . 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Scholars and experts have also 
juxtaposed small data policing and surveillance practices with big data policing and 
surveillance practices as a way to deepen the legal and constitutional discourse. See, e.g., 
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. 
REV. 327, 329 (2015) (discussing what happens if particularized small data suspicion is 
replaced by big data suspicion in the context of predictive policing practices); Toomey & 
Kaufman, supra note 6, at 847 (describing a “notice paradox” whereby in a small data 
surveillance world notice was usually given because searches were limited to a “physical 
world,” whereas big data surveillance methods provided the government significant control 
over when, and to whom, notice is given). 
 24. See Cohen, supra note 10, at 1920–21 (“Together, the technology and the process 
[of big data] comprise a technique for converting data flows into a particular, highly data-
intensive type of knowledge.”); danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big 
Data: Provocations for a Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO., 
COMM. & SOC’Y 662, 662–79 (2012) (discussing how big data creates new forms of 
knowledge and the processes by which we produce knowledge and perception). 
 25. See generally, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance 
State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Balkin, National Surveillance State]; Jack M. 
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan 
Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (2006); Neil M. 
Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013). 
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programs revealed by the Snowden disclosures presents critical foci for 
future legal and constitutional analysis.26 
II. “Collect It All”: Collection Programs 
From the Snowden disclosures, it appears that collection programs 
are used to gather information from a wide range of sources, including the 
content of communications (traditional wiretapping), non-content of 
communications (metadata of phone records, such as the time and 
duration of a call, but not the conversation of the call), and the non-
content of non-communications, but, digital data generated through social 
media (data points of a digital photograph taken from the internet for 
potential facial recognition technology use).27 These programs can 
incorporate big data collection, small data collection, or both.28 Some 
programs exhibit a physical element, such as hardwiring into a fiber 
                                                                                                                  
 26. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 23, at 803–05 (following the Snowden disclosures, at least 
one expert has asserted that the NSA is attempting to merge big data tools with small 
data tools). See generally Crawford, supra note 23. Scholars and experts have also 
juxtaposed small data policing and surveillance practices with big data policing and 
surveillance practices as a way to deepen the legal and constitutional discourse. See, e.g., 
Ferguson, supra note 23, at 329 (discussing what happens if particularized small data 
suspicion is replaced by big data suspicion in the context of predictive policing practices); 
Toomey & Kaufman, supra note 6, at 847 (describing a “notice paradox” whereby in a 
small data surveillance world notice was usually given because searches were limited to a 
“physical world,” whereas big data surveillance methods provided the government 
significant control over when, and to whom, notice is given). 
 27. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Government Declassifies 2007 Surveillance Court 
Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/01/27/ 
us/27-fisc-foia-documents.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (citing Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Application for Authority to Conduct Electronic Surveillance, U.S. Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (Dec. 12, 2005), https://assets.documentcloud.org/ 
documents/1509488/nyt-savage-foia-fisc-may-august-2007-orders.pdf) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review)); Charlie Savage, Documents Show N.S.A.’s Wiretap 
Moves Without Congress’s Approval, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2015/01/28/us/documents-show-nsas-wiretap-moves-before-congresss-approval.html 
?_r=0 (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Glenn 
Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-
records-verizon-court-order (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Collecting Millions of Faces From 
Web Images, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-
collecting-millions-of-faces-from-web-images.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 28. Following the Snowden disclosures, at least one expert has asserted that the NSA 
is attempting to merge big data tools with small data tools. Crawford, supra note 23. 
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connection at a major hub.29 Others gather data from telecommunication 
or software companies.30  
The “Collect-It-All” theory of covert cybersurveillance appears to be 
driven by a historical dimension as well as a modern technological 
dimension. On one hand, a “collect-it-all” approach in a small data world 
was a deeply-rooted, historical precept of intelligence gathering. As David 
Pozen explains, “[A] basic precept of intelligence gathering . . . [is that] 
[d]isparate items of information, though individually of limited or no 
utility to their possessor, can take on added significance when combined 
with other items of information.”31 At the same time, the theory and 
science of big data requires a “collect-it-all” approach in a big data world.32 
The algorithmic intelligence of big data tools drives incentives for 
comprehensive and ubiquitous data collection for big data accuracy 
purposes.33 As one intelligence official explained, “[e]verybody’s a target; 
everybody with [digital] communication is a target.”34 From the Snowden 
disclosures, it appears that a big data “target” is not a small data “target.” 
Under traditional surveillance methods that tracked and intercepted 
traditional communications, a small data “target” was akin to a suspect or 
a known or suspected terrorist, for example. In contrast, from the 
Snowden disclosures, it appears that a big data “target” is a digital data 
target. Under big data cybersurveillance architecture, big data tools 
appear to track and isolate suspicious data and not suspicious persons. 
Thus, “everybody’s a target; everybody with [digital] communications is a 
                                                                                                                  
 29. Craig Timberg, NSA Slide Shows Surveillance of Undersea Cables, WASH. POST 
(July 10, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-
havent-seen/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2015) (“A classified NSA slide obtained by The Washington Post . . . shows a 
separate category [of data collection] labeled ‘Upstream,’ described as accessing 
‘communications on fiber cables and infrastructure as data flows past . . . .’”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 30. T.C. Sottek & Joshua Kopstein, Everything You Need to Know About PRISM, THE 
VERGE (July 17, 2013, 1:36 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/7/17/4517480/nsa-spying-
prism-surveillance-cheat-sheet (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (“PRISM is considered a highly 
classified program that allows the National Security Agency and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation to retrieve data directly from Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, 
AOL, Skype, YouTube, and Apple.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 31. David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of 
Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 630 (2005).  
 32. GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 95. 
 33. Sottek & Kopstein, supra note 30. 
 34. See generally BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE: INSIDE THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
AGENCY, AMERICA’S MOST SECRET INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (1982). 
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target” of the Intelligence Community by historical, theoretical, and 
technological default. 
In other words, “collect-it-all” big data cybersurveillance and mass 
dataveillance tools are in the process of transforming into a “connect-the-
dots” theory of intelligence gathering. Rachel Levinson-Waldman explains 
the “connect-the-dots” theory of big data cybersurveillance and mass 
dataveillance this way: “One chief argument in favor of retaining all 
information gathered, regardless of its apparent law enforcement value, is 
that seemingly innocuous information may prove meaningful today or in 
the future when connected with other ‘dots’ of information.”35 Multiple 
leaders in the intelligence community, including Gus Hunt, Chief 
Technology Officer of the CIA, have used this theory: 
The value of any piece of information is only known when you can 
connect it with something else that arrives at a future point in time[.] 
Since you can’t connect dots you don’t have, it drives us into a mode of, 
we fundamentally try to collect everything and hang on to it forever.36 
Former NSA Director, General Keith Alexander, similarly used the 
“connect-the-dots” theory to justify NSA cybersurveillance programs after 
the Snowden disclosures.37 The process of combining these dots into a 
pattern that suggests terrorist activity is generally called data mining, or 
“pattern prediction”: analyzing a store of data to tease out patterns 
connected to certain behaviors, and then looking for matching patterns in 
other datasets in order to predict other instances in which those behaviors 
are likely to occur.38 
Consequently, both the historical precepts of small data intelligence 
gathering and big data cybersurveillance systems appear to be dependent 
upon a “collect-it-all” approach or a “connect-the-dots” theory of mass 
surveillance.39 This new approach to intelligence gathering is highly 
                                                                                                                  
 35. LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 15, at 17 (citing Pozen, supra note 31, at 630–31).  
 36. Matt Sledge, CIA’s Gus Hunt on Big Data: We ‘Try to Collect Everything and 
Hang onto It Forever,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2013/03/20/ cia-gus-hunt-big-data_n_2917842.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2015) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 37. See Collect It All: America’s Surveillance State, ALJAZEERA (Nov. 7, 2013), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/faultlines/2013/11/collect-it-all-america-surveillance-
state-20131158358543439.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2015) (showing video of General 
Alexander justifying the NSA cybersurveillance programs) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 38. LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 15, at 17.  
 39. See, e.g., GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 97 (displaying a top secret presentation 
slide which explains that the NSA embraces a “collect it all” approach to gathering data).  
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controversial;40 as Levinson-Waldman explains, it is a put-the-
“haystack-before-the-needle approach to information gathering.”41 
Stephen Vladeck further notes that there is a presumption that there is, 
in fact, a needle in the haystack.42 In short, big data cybersurveillance 
tools allow for the presumption that there is a needle in the haystack, and 
such a presumption may appear to justify a “collect-it-all” approach. 
Also worthy of caution is the fact that this presumption presents the 
potential for multiple challenges,43 including integrating biases into 
data-driven systems (confirmation bias, implicit bias, cognitive bias); path 
dependency (building systems to guarantee a correlative “hit” or “miss” 
that is intended to indicate data is suspicious; and assuming statistical 
certainty that suspicious data proves guilt of terroristic or criminal 
threat); overreliance on automation and risk of undertrained analysts; 
and exacerbation of perverse incentives (metrics of success designed to 
track the number of suspects identified rather than assess whether 
intelligence can independently verify suspect classification). In other 
words, presuming that there is a digitally constructed needle—a suspect, 
terrorist target, or a pre-crime or pre-terrorist threat that can be digitally 
identified through big data tools—in the government’s digitally 
constructed haystack44 (e.g., government’s attempt to store and analyze 
all digitally produced data in order to, purportedly, preempt crime and 
terrorism)45 can create incentives to construct imaginary needles. 
                                                                                                                  
 40. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 6, at 1636 (explaining the issues that surveillance 
causes for law enforcement in regards to the consistency in procedures being followed). 
 41. Vladeck, Big Data Before and After Snowden, supra note 6 (citing Rachel 
Levinson-Waldman, The Double Danger of the NSA’s “Collect It All” Policy on Surveillance, 
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/10/ 
double-danger-nsa-surveillance (last visited Sept. 6, 2015) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review)). 
 42. Id. at 334 n.11.  
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. (“One of the government’s principal descriptive justifications for the 
metadata program is the need to collect the haystack in order to find the needle.”).  
 45. See Ira Hunt, Even the CIA Is Struggling to Deal with the Volume of Real-Time 
Social Data, GIGAOM (Mar. 20, 2013), https://gigaom.com/2013/03/20/even-the-cia-is-
struggling-to-deal-with-the-volume-of-real-time-social-data/2/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2015) 
(discussing the government’s interest in obtaining and analyzing real-time social data) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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Table 1 provides examples of collection programs revealed by the 
Snowden disclosures that can be described as “Collect It All” programs. 
Table 1. Examples of Collection Programs 
                                                                                                                  
 46. GREENWALD, supra note 1.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
NSA’s Bulk Telephony 
Metadata Collection 
Program (NSA) 
“The National Security Agency is currently collecting the 
telephone records of millions of U.S. customers of Verizon, 
one of America’s largest telecoms providers, under a top 
secret court order issued in April.”46 “Under the terms of 
the blanket order, the numbers of both parties on a call are 
handed over, as is location data, call duration, unique 
identifiers, and the time and duration of all calls.”47 “[T]he 
communication records of millions of US citizens are being 
collected indiscriminately and in bulk—regardless of 
whether they are suspected of any wrongdoing.”48  
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 49. Everything You Need to Know About PRISM, THE VERGE (July 17, 2013), 
http://www.theverge.com/2013/7/17/4517480/nsa-spying-prism-surveillance-cheat-sheet 
(last visited Sept. 6, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill, Laura Poitras, Spencer Ackerman & Dominic 
Rushe, Microsoft Handed the NSA Access to Encrypted Messages, THE GUARDIAN (July 12, 
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-
data (last visited Sept. 6, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. James Ball, Edward Snowden NSA Files: Secret Surveillance and Our Revelations 
so Far, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world 
/2013/aug/21/edward-snowden-nsa-files-revelations (last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Laura Poitras, Marcel Rosenbach & Holger Stark, Codename ‘Apalachee’: How 
America Spies on Europe and the UN, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Aug. 26, 2013), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/secret-nsa-documents-show-how-the-us-spies-
on-europe-and-the-un-a-918625.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
PRISM49  
(NSA) 
“PRISM is a tool used by the [NSA] to collect private 
electronic data belonging to URLs [(uniform resource 
locator)] of major internet services like Gmail, Facebook, 
Outlook, and others.”50 “Material collected through Prism 
is routinely shared with the FBI and CIA, with one NSA 
document describing the program as a ‘team sport.’”51 The 
NSA’s Special Source Operations (SSO) division is 
responsible for all programs directed at U.S. 
communications systems through corporate partnerships 
like PRISM.52 The sharing between the NSA, the FBI and 
the CIA has automated aspects that “enable[s] [them] to 
see which selectors [search terms] the National Security 








NSA’s collection of both metadata and the content of 
communications traveling through fiber-optic cables.55 The 
identities of the four U.S. telecom providers that cooperate 
with the NSA are tightly guarded.56 Reportedly, some 
11,000 pieces of information come from Blarney every year. 
It is one of the “top sources” for the President’s daily brief, 
a top-secret document briefing the president every 
morning on security matters.57 
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III. “Process It All”: Processing Programs  
Processing programs appear to be used to organize and quantify the 
vast amount of information gathered by collection programs.58 Processing 
programs appear to be built to make sense of a “tsunami of intercept,”59 or 
“unthinkably large”60 volumes of information now generated by big data 
collection tools. Processing programs appear to drop the identified data 
into the proper database, or to flag a piece of data based on “selectors.”61 
These selectors are instrumental in ascribing a threat level to a particular 
person, group, IP address,62 digital user of certain key words,63 consumer  
  
                                                                                                                  
 58. See, e.g., Peter Maass, Inside NSA, Officials Privately Criticize “Collect It All” 
Surveillance, THE INTERCEPT (May 28, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/05/28/nsa-
officials-privately-criticize-collect-it-all-surveillance/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2015) (citing to 
NSA documents that “outlined a series of programs to prepare for a near future in which 
the speed and volume of signals intelligence would explode ‘almost beyond imagination’”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Cole, supra note 22 
In a one-month period last year, for example, a single unit of the NSA, the 
Global Access Operations unit, collected data on more than 97 billion e-mails 
and 124 billion phone calls from around the world; more than 3 billion of those 
calls and e-mails were collected as they passed through the United States. As of 
2012, the agency was processing more than 20 billion telecommunications per 
day. In a single month in 2011, the NSA collected 71 million calls and e-mails 
from Poland alone—not a major hub of terrorist activity, the last time I checked. 
The NSA has admitted that it collects far more content than is routinely useful 
to analysts. 
 59. Maass, supra note 58 (citing Dealing with a Tsunami of Intercept, THE INTERCEPT 
(May 5, 2015), https://theintercept.com/document/2015/05/05/dealing-tsunami-intercept/ 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)). 
 60. See, e.g., VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A 
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 157 (2013) (“When the 
collection expands to information like financial transactions, health records, and Facebook 
status updates, the quantity being gleaned is unthinkably large.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Gellman & Poitras, supra note 18 (“Analysts who use the system 
[PRISM] from a Web portal at Fort Meade, Md., key in ‘selectors,’ or search terms, that are 
designed to produce at least 51 percent confidence in a target’s ‘foreignness.’”). 
 62. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects ‘Nearly Everything a 
User Does on the Internet,’ THE GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013), http://www.the 
guardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data (last visited Nov. 24, 
2015) (“Analysts can also search by name, telephone number, IP address, keywords, the 
language in which the internet activity was conducted or the type of browser used.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 63. Id. 
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of software intended to secure browsing privacy,64 etc.65 
Table 2 provides examples of processing programs that help to 
illuminate the “Process It All” posture of the intelligence community. 
Table 2. Examples of Processing Programs 
                                                                                                                  
 64.  See, e.g., Spiegel Staff, Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA’s War on Internet Security, 
SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Dec. 28, 2014), www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-
nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2015) (“For the NSA, 
encrypted communication—or what all other Internet users would call secure 
communication—is ‘a threat.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 65. See Ryan Gallagher, How the NSA Is Trying to Sabotage a U.S. 
Government-Funded Countersurveillance Tool, SLATE (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.slate. 
com/blogs/future_tense/2013/10/04/tor_foxacid_flying_pig_nsa_attempts_to_sabotage_coun
tersurveillance_tool.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2015) (explaining that the TOR browser, 
created by the U.S. government to help secure military communications, is a more secure 
way of browsing the Internet; the NSA, however, considers the use of TOR as an 
“extremist” activity and is constantly developing ways to bypass its security or render it 
unusable) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 66. Glenn Greenwald & Spencer Ackerman, How the NSA Is Still Harvesting Your 
Online Data, THE GUARDIAN (June 27, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/ 
jun/27/nsa-online-metadata-collection (last visited Sept. 9, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 




SHELLTRUMPET “began as a near-real-time metadata analyzer . . . for 
a classic collection system.”67 “In its five year history, numerous other 
systems from across the Agency have come to use SHELLTRUMPET’s 
processing capabilities for performance monitoring and other tasks, 
such as direct email tip alerting.”68 “On December 31, 2012, an SSO 
official wrote that SHELLTRUMPET had just processed its One 
Trillionth metadata record.”69 
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IV. “Exploit It All”: Attack Programs 
Attack programs go beyond passive surveillance and actively impact 
an isolated entity’s electronic communication or technological device in 
some way.77 These programs vary in application and encompass what has  
                                                                                                                  
 70. Scott Shane, No Morsel Too Miniscule for All-Consuming N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
3, 2013, at A1. 
 71. Id. 
 72. James Ball, Privacy International to Challenge Telecom Firms over GCHQ 
Cooperation, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/ 
aug/08/privacy-international-challenges-bt-vodafone-gchq (last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Ball, supra note 54. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, Blog Entries Tagged “Exploit of the Day,” SCHNEIER ON 
SECURITY (Mar. 12, 2014), https://www.schneier.com/cgi-bin/mt/mt-search.cgi?search 
=exploit%20of%20the%20day&__mode=tag&IncludeBlogs=2&limit=10&page=1 (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2015) 
It’s important that we know the details of these attack tools. Not because we 
want to evade the NSA—although some of us do—but because the NSA doesn’t 
have a monopoly on either technology or cleverness. The NSA might have a 
larger budget than every other intelligence agency in the world combined, but 
these tools are the sorts of things that any well-funded nation-state adversary 
would use. And as technology advances, they are the sorts of tools we’re going to 
see cybercriminals use. So think of this less as what the NSA does, and more of 
SNACKS70 
(NSA) 
NSA’s “Social Network Analysis Collaboration Knowledge Services” 




GCHQ’s (UK) TEMPORA program has been described as an “internet 
buffer that lets analysts search vast databases of metadata on internet 
traffic crossing the UK, for up to 30 days after data is sent.” “GCHQ’s 
internet monitoring allows it to tap up to a quarter of internet traffic 
flowing through the UK at any one time, then use the NSA-developed 
XKEYSCORE system to search for individuals’ communications, search 
terms, browsing habits, and more. GCHQ and NSA analysts have direct 
access to the data collected.”73 
XKEYSCORE74 
(NSA) 
XKEYSCORE is the system “used to collect, process and search these 
vast troves of data.”75 “One presentation, published . . . in the Guardian, 
claimed the system allowed NSA analysts to query ‘nearly everything a 
typical user does on the internet,’ including the content of emails, 
websites visited and searches, as well as their metadata. The system 
works almost in real-time, documents claimed.”76 
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been described as hacking.78 
Table 3 provides examples of attack, malware, and hacking programs. 
Table 3. Examples of Attack Programs 
QUANTUMHAND 
(Disguised Social 
Media Site Malware) 
(NSA) 
Through QUANTUMHAND, “the agency disguises itself as a fake 
Facebook server. . . . By concealing its malware within what looks 
like an ordinary Facebook page, the NSA is able to hack into the 






“Sometimes, the agency’s aim is disruption rather than 
surveillance.”80 QUANTUMSKY “is used to block targets from 
accessing certain websites.”81 QUANTUMCOPPER “corrupts a 





SECONDDATE can “‘influence real-time communications between 
client and server’” and “‘quietly redirect web-browsers’ to NSA 
malware servers called FOXACID.”83 
                                                                                                                  
a head start as to what everyone will be using. Which means we need to figure 
out how to defend against them. 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).   
 78. Joanna Walters, NSA ‘Hacking Unit’ Infiltrates Computers Around the World—
Report, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 29, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/der-
spiegel-nsa-hacking-unit-tao (last visited Nov. 24, 2015) (citing to Speigel Staff, Inside 
TAO: Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Dec. 29, 2013), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-
global-networks-a- 940969.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2015) (on file with Washington and 
Lee Law Review)) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 79. Ryan Gallagher & Glenn Greenwald, How the NSA Plans to Infect ‘Millions’ of 
Computers with Malware, THE INTERCEPT (Mar. 12, 2014), https://theintercept. 
com/2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2015) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. (citing a “top-secret NSA presentation from 2012”). 
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TURBINE (NSA) “[G]roundbreaking surveillance technology [NSA] has developed to 
infect potentially millions of computers worldwide with malware 
‘implants.’”84 The automated hacking cybersurveillance technology 
“enables the NSA to break into targeted computers and to siphon 
data from foreign Internet and phone networks.”85  
V.  “Sniff It All”: Isolation Programs 
Isolation programs single out a person, group, Internet location, or 
other entity or device for specialized surveillance.86 Important, albeit 
nuanced, differences exist between isolation programs, attack programs, 
and targeting. While isolation programs may still involve passive 
surveillance, even though it is more focused, an attack program appears 
actively impact the isolated entity’s computer via malware or spyware.  
Table 4 provides examples of isolation programs that appear to flag 
persons, entities, and devices for heightened suspicion and to isolate them 
for more concentrated surveillance activities. 
                                                                                                                  
 84. Id. 
In 2004, according to secret internal records, the agency was managing a 
small network of only 100 to 150 implants. But over the next six to eight 
years, as an elite unit called Tailored Access Operations (TAO) recruited 
new hackers and developed new malware tools, the number of implants 
soared to tens of thousands. . . . [TURBINE] is described in the leaked 
documents as an “intelligent command and control capability” that 
enables “industrial-scale exploitation.” 
 85. See id. (“The automated system—codenamed TURBINE—is designed to ‘allow the 
current implant network to scale to large size (millions of implants) by creating a system 
that does automated control implants by groups instead of individually.’”). 
 86. See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, Surveillance by Algorithm, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Mar. 
5, 2014), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/03/surveillance_by.html (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2015) 
Increasingly, we are watched not by people but by algorithms. . . . If the agency 
uses computers to search those emails for keywords, or correlates that location 
information for relationships between people, it doesn’t count as collection, 
either. Only when those computers spit out a particular person has the data—in 
NSA terms—actually been collected. 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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VI. “Partner It All” and “Know It All”: Database Programs 
Database programs appear to store sorted and categorized information 
for later access and analysis,92 and to facilitate intelligence partnering.93 
These immense repositories of information allow for the picture of the 
digital self94 to be better realized, but they also facilitate the sharing of data 
                                                                                                                  
 87. Shane, supra note 70, at A1. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Poitras, Rosenbach & Stark, supra note 57. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id.  
 92. See Greenwald, supra note 62 (“A top secret National Security Agency program 
allows analysts to search with no prior authorization through vast databases containing 
emails, online chats and the browsing histories of millions of individuals.”).  
 93. See, e.g., Ryan Gallagher, How Secret Partners Expand NSA’s Surveillance 
Dragnet, THE INTERCEPT (June 18, 2014), https://theintercept.com/2014/06/18/nsa-
surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2015) 
The NSA documents state that under RAMPART-A, foreign partners ‘provide 
access to cables and host U.S. equipment.’ This allows the agency to covertly tap 
into ‘congestion points around the world’ where it says it can intercept the 
content of phone calls, faxes, e-mails, internet chats, data from virtual private 
networks, and calls made using Voice over IP software like Skype. 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 94. The concept of “digital personhood” describes how “digital dossiers” can be created 
by others to construct our “data-double,” “data image,” “digital persona,” and “digital self.” 
See, e.g., Roger Clarke, The Digital Persona and Its Application to Data Surveillance, 10 
THE INFO. SOC. 2, 77–92 (1994); Robert Gordon, The Electronic Personality and Digital Self, 
56 DISP. RESOL. J. 8 (2001); Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant 
Assemblage, 51 BRIT. J. SOC. 605 (2000); DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 
87 (2007) (citing DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 19 
(1994)); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE (2004); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth 
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1149–51 (2002). 
SPINALTAP87 
(NSA) 
Program under the “Tailored Access Operations” branch of the NSA. It 
is used to identify unique Internet Protocol addresses used by groups, 
which makes it possible to snatch messages from a flood of global 
communications sifted by the agency.88 
RAMPART-T 
(NSA) 
NSA program that has been running since 1991.89 This program 
involves “penetration of hard targets at or near the leadership level”—in 
other words: heads of state and their closest aides.”90 RAMPART-T is 
directed against some 20 countries, including China and Russia, but 
also Eastern European states.91 
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between intelligence organizations internally,95 and between intelligence 
organizations externally.96  
Table 5 provides examples of database programs.  
                                                                                                                  
 95. See, e.g., Ryan Gallagher, The Surveillance Engine: How the NSA Built Its Own 
Secret Google, THE INTERCEPT (Aug. 25, 2014), https://theintercept.com/2014/08/25/icreach-
nsa-cia-secret-google-crisscross-proton/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2015) (“The National Security 
Agency is secretly providing data to nearly two dozen U.S. government agencies with a 
‘Google-like’ search engine built to share more than 850 billion records about phone calls, 
emails, cellphone locations, and internet chats, according to classified documents obtained 
by The Intercept.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 96. See, e.g., Owen Bowcott, UK–US Surveillance Regime was Unlawful ‘for Seven 
Years,’ THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2015/feb/06/gchq-mass-internet-surveillance-unlawful-court-nsa (last visited Nov. 24, 
2015) (“The Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) declared on Friday that regulations 
covering access by Britain’s GCHQ to emails and phone records intercepted by the US 
National Security Agency (NSA) breached human rights law.” (citing Liberty v. Secretary 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Investigatory Power Tribunal (June 2, 
2015), http://www.ipt-uk.com/docs/Liberty_Ors_Judgment_6Feb15.pdf)) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); James Ball, US and UK Struck Secret Deal to Allow 
NSA to ‘Unmask’ Britons’ Personal Data, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/20/us-uk-secret-deal-surveillance-personal-
data (last visited Nov. 24, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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 97. James Ball, NSA Collects Millions of Text Messages Daily in ‘Untargeted’ Global 
Sweep, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-
collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargeted-global-sweep (last visited Sept. 8, 2015) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See James Risen & Laura Poitras, NSA Gathers Data on Social Connections of 
U.S. Citizens, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-
examines-social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?_r=0 (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (explaining 
that MAINWAY is “a repository into which vast amounts of data flow daily from the 
agency’s fiber-optic cables, corporate partners and foreign computer networks that have 
been hacked”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. James Ball, NSA Stores Metadata of Millions of Web Users for Up to a Year, 
Secret Files Show, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2013/sep/30/nsa-americans-metadata-year-documents (last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 105. Id. 
 106. Shane, supra note 70. 




NSA database that stores years of text messages from around the 
world. “The [NSA] has collected almost 200 million text messages a day 
from across the globe, using them to extract data including location, 
contact networks and credit card details.”98 According to GCHQ 
documents, DISHFIRE collects “pretty much everything it can.”99 
MAINWAY100 
(NSA) 
MAINWAY is an NSA phone metadata repository that is “one of the 
main tools used for chaining phone numbers and e-mail 
addresses . . . .”101 The system compiles metadata for hundreds of 
billions of telephone calls made through AT&T and Verizon. Beginning 
in 2011, MAINWAY was collecting 700 million phone records per 
day,102 and “[i]n August 2011, it began receiving an additional 1.1 
billion cellphone records daily from an unnamed American service 
provider under Section 702 of the 2008 FISA Amendments Act, which 
allows for the collection of the data of Americans if at least one end of 
the communication is believed to be foreign.”103 
MARINA104 
(NSA) 
Database of metadata stored on millions of internet users for up to a 
year. “The . . . metadata application tracks a user’s browser experience, 
gathers contact information/content and develops summaries of target.” 
“This tool offers the ability to export the data in a variety of formats, as 
well as create various charts to assist in pattern-of-life development.”105 
TRACFIN106 
(NSA) 
NSA database that stores credit card purchase histories.107 
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VII. Conclusion 
Distinctions between small data surveillance and big data 
cybersurveillance are difficult to grasp in light of the opacity of the 
intelligence gathering programs and the technical complexity of the 
technologies now deployed. Small data intelligence gathering108 methods 
in a small data world have relied upon human intelligence, including 
human sensory perception analysis, and other communication gathering 
and analytic methods that have depended upon human judgment and 
human decision making; traditional evidence based upon analog data and 
paper-based files; traditional intelligence collection methods, such as 
traditional signals intelligence and other traditional communications 
interception; and other data analytic tools that have centered upon 
traditional research approaches, such as hypothesis-driven methods.109  
Yet several scholars have begun to use the term “big data 
surveillance” to describe how surveillance methods are evolving in light of 
the emerging pervasiveness of big data technologies.110 Following the 
Snowden disclosures, at least one expert has asserted that the NSA is 
attempting to merge big data tools with small data tools.111 At the dawn of 
the big data revolution, scholars are now actively interrogating the 
implications of government-led big data uses by the government and law 
                                                                                                                  
 108. “‘Small data,’ like ‘big data,’ has no set definition.” Ferguson, supra note 23, at 
329 n.6. “Small data” has been described in the following way: “Generally, small data is 
thought of as solving discrete questions with limited and structured data, and the data are 
generally controlled by one institution.” Id. (citing JULES J. BERMAN, PRINCIPLES OF BIG 
DATA: PREPARING, SHARING, AND ANALYZING COMPLEX INFORMATION 1–2 (2013)).  
 109. See, e.g., ROBERT M. CLARK, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 45–83 (2014) (describing 
small data collection methods through human intelligence (HUMINT)). See generally 
ROBERT WALLACE & H. KEITH MELTON, WITH HENRY R. SCHLESINGER, SPYCRAFT: THE SECRET 
HISTORY OF THE CIA’S SPYTECHS FROM COMMUNISM TO AL-QAEDA (2008) (listing the various 
ways that the CIA has acquired intelligence throughout its existence).  
 110. See, e.g., Mark Andrejevic, Surveillance in the Big Data Era, in EMERGING 
PERVASIVE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES (PICT): ETHICAL CHALLENGES, 
OPPORTUNITIES, AND SAFEGUARDS 56 (Kenneth D. Pimple ed., 2014) (“[I]n the era of ‘big 
data’ surveillance, the imperative is to monitor the population as a whole: otherwise it is 
harder to consistently and reliably discern useful patterns.”); David Lyon, Surveillance, 
Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, Consequences, Critique, BIG DATA & SOC’Y (July 9, 
2014), http://bds.sagepub.com/content/1/2/2053951714541861.full.pdf+html (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2015) (“The Big Data/surveillance link was recognized by US President Obama on 
17 January 2014, when he called for a ‘comprehensive review of Big Data and privacy’ 
following the Snowden leaks.” (citation omitted)) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 111. Crawford, supra note 23. 
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enforcement.112 Several scholars have noted how transformative 
technological shifts have also transformed methods of governance and 
surveillance as a tool of governance, including the transformation of the 
administrative state into a National Surveillance State.113  
This Essay attempts to contribute to this important discourse 
through expository research that is largely empirical in its method, with 
the recognition that a true empirical approach is challenged given the 
covert nature of the subject matter. Various scholars have juxtaposed 
small data policing and surveillance practices with big data policing and 
surveillance practices as a way to deepen the legal and constitutional 
discourse.114 Many experts have documented how the NSA, CIA and other 
intelligence organizations capitalized on technological innovation in the 
evolution and expansion of intelligence-gathering tools and methods.115 
                                                                                                                  
 112. See generally, Fairfield & Luna, supra note 9 (illustrating how data mining has 
applications in exonerating innocent parties, despite the privacy concerns); David Gray & 
Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013) (explaining 
the negative effects that surveillance has on personal development); Neil M. Richards, The 
Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013) (stating that data mining and 
surveillance increases the power disparity between individual and government, and can 
harm free exercise of civil liberties). 
 113. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. 2296, 2297 (2014) (“The digital era is different. Governments can target for control 
or surveillance many different aspects of the digital infrastructure that people use to 
communicate: telecommunications and broadband companies, web hosting services, 
domain name registrars, search engines, social media platforms, payment systems, and 
advertisers.”); Balkin, supra note 2 (“The question is not whether we will have a 
surveillance state in the years to come, but what sort of surveillance state we will have.”). 
See generally Balkin & Levinson, supra note 2 (illustrating how partisan philosophies from 
decades ago indicated that this could happen); David Lyon, Biometrics, Identification and 
Surveillance, 22 BIOETHICS 499 (2008) (pointing out that biometric data grants the 
government a non-invasive method to identify individuals); Erin Murphy, Paradigms of 
Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2008) (saying that, while useful, these government programs 
are excessively controlling without any scrutiny); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Signaling 
Exhaustion and Perfect Exclusion, 10 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 321 (2012) (stating 
that we are in an entirely new era of technology that is cementing inequality by 
homogenizing contacts). 
 114. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 23, at 329 (discussing in the context of predictive 
policing practices: “[W]hat happens if this small data suspicion [suspicion that is 
‘individualized to a particular person at a particular place’] is replaced by ‘big data’ 
suspicion?”); Toomey & Kaufman, supra note 6, at 847 (describing a “notice paradox” 
whereby, in a small data surveillance world, notice was usually given because searches 
were limited to a “physical world,” whereas big data surveillance methods provided the 
government significant control over when and to whom notice is given). 
 115. See generally, e.g., JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY: THE ULTRA-SECRET 
NSA FROM 9/11 TO THE EAVESDROPPING ON AMERICA (2008) (detailing how the NSA’s 
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Some have focused particularly on the algorithmic-driven decision-making 
consequences of emerging big data technologies.116 Other experts have 
focused on the data mining and predictive analytic capacities of big data 
tools.117 
This Essay concludes that a detailed examination of the Snowden 
disclosures requires not only a careful inquiry into the legal and 
constitutional framework that guides the oversight of these programs. A 
close interrogation also requires a careful inquiry into the big data 
technological architecture, as well as the theories of data science and the 
rationales of big data-driven policymaking that informs them. These 
technological, theoretical, and policymaking movements are occurring 
within what has been termed by scholars as the National Surveillance 
State. Better understanding the manner in which intelligence gathering 
may be shifting away from small data surveillance methods and toward 
the adoption of big data cybersurveillance methods—and assessing 
the efficacy of this shift118—can serve as a foundation for 
                                                                                                                  
technology has been evolving to maintain an ability to unscramble cryptic 
communications); BAMFORD, supra note 34 (explaining the Armed Forces Security Agency’s 
methods for cracking cleartext and cryptanalyzed ciphertext); Banks, supra note 6; Swire, 
supra note 6 (observing that espionage agencies are now able to use data-mining to 
identify terrorists); GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 97 (citing NSA slide from Snowden 
disclosures titled, “New Collection Posture,” quoting NSA data collection procedure as 
“Collect it All”); see also Cole, supra note 22 (“In one remarkable [NSA] slide presented at 
a 2011 meeting of five nations’ intelligence agencies and revealed here for the first time, 
the NSA described its “collection posture” as ‘Collect It All,’ ‘Process It All,’ ‘Exploit It All,’ 
‘Partner It All,’ ‘Sniff It All’ and, ultimately, ‘Know It All.’”). 
 116. See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY (2015) (comparing the existing 
intelligence systems to error-prone commercial credit scoring systems); Danielle Keats 
Citron & Frank A. Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 
89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 20–22 (2014) (stating the need for oversight on existing automated 
scoring systems used by intelligence agencies to analyze possible threats). 
 117. See, e.g., STEVEN FINLAY, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS, DATA MINING AND BIG DATA: 
MYTHS, MISCONCEPTIONS, AND METHODS (2014) (stating that big data has become a price to 
organizations large enough to use it for professional purposes); ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE 
ANALYTICS: THE POWER TO PREDICT WHO WILL CLICK, BUY, LIE, OR DIE 3 (2013) (saying that 
data mining increases by “an estimated 2.5 quintillion bytes per day”); NATE SILVER, THE 
SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY SO MANY PREDICTIONS FAIL—BUT SOME DON’T (2012) (pointing 
out ways in which predictive analysis is becoming increasingly accurate). See generally 
Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 435 (2008) (documenting the need for regulations now that data mining has 
become ubiquitous); Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth 
Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317 (2008) (listing legal concerns over governmental and 
third party data mining); Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security–Liberty Debate, 
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343 (2008) (advocating that “courts fail to give adequate scrutiny to 
security interests”). 
 118. Several recent reports, conducted by both the public and nonprofit sectors, have 
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debates119 on how best to constrain comprehensive and ubiquitous 
surveillance technologies under the rule of law at the dawn of the 
National Surveillance State. 
  
                                                                                                                  
investigated the efficacy of several of the programs revealed by the Snowden disclosures. 
See, e.g., PETER BERGEN, DAVID STERMAN, EMILY SCHNEIDER & BAILEY CAHALL, NEW 
AMERICA FOUNDATION, DO NSA’S BULK SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS? (2014), 
https://static.newamerica.org/ attachments/1311-do-nsas-bulk-surveillance-programs-stop-
terrorists/IS_NSA_surveillance.pdf (arguing that “traditional” investigative tools like the 
use of informants have been the primary method used by the NSA in counterterrorism 
operations in the past); RICHARD A. CLARKE, MICHAEL J. MORRELL, GEOFFREY R. STONE, 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN & PETER SWIRE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND 
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES (2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf (describing how the effectiveness of big data 
surveillance relies on the enemy’s ignorance); LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 15; PRIVACY 
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM 
CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-
Report_on_the_ Telephone_Records_Program.pdf (stating that the NSA’s phone records 
program fails to meet effectiveness requirements); PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT 
BOARD, REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF 
THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (2014), https://www.pclob.gov /library/702-
Report.pdf (observing difficulties in assessing the efficacy of surveillance programs). 
 119. See, e.g., Jennifer Stisa Granick & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Opinion, The 
Criminal N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
06/28/opinion/the-criminal-nsa.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (“If all data is ‘relevant,’ it 
makes a mockery of the already shaky concept of relevance.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Bruce Schneier, NSA Surveillance: A Guide to Staying Secure, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-
remain-secure-surveillance (last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (“The NSA has turned the fabric of 
the internet into a vast surveillance platform, but they are not magical.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Glyn Moody, The Repeated Failure of the US and UK 
Governments’ ‘Add More Hay’ Approach to Surveillance, TECHDIRT (Dec. 3, 2014), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141201/09320729286/repeated-failure-us-uk-governments-
add-more-hay-approach-to-surveillance.shtml (last visited Sept. 9, 2015) (pointing out that 
mistakes are still made despite this data influx) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
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Appendix: The Snowden Disclosures [from June 2013 to January 2015] 
Program Name Type Description 
A-PLUS120 Collection NSA program listed under “Collect it 
All” that states it will: “Increase volume 
of signals: ASPHALT/A-PLUS”121 
ACRIDMINI122 Collection NSA program that is listed as being 
under BOUNDLESSINFORMANT,123 a 
GCHQ [Government Communications 
Headquarters], Britain’s intelligence, 
and security program.124 
AGILEVIEW125 Collection NSA “DNI [digital network intelligence] 
tool.”126 
AGILITY127 Database NSA “DNI [digital network intelligence] 
tool.”128  
AIGHANDLER129 Processing NSA program used for “geolocation 
analysis.”130 
                                                                                                                  
 120. GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 97. 
 121. Id.  
 122. The NSA in Germany: Snowden’s Documents Available for Download, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE INT’L (June 18, 2014, 4:21 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-germany-
file-of-edward-snowden-documents-available-for-download-a-975917.html (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Glenn Greenwald, Snowden’s Documents Reveal Covert Surveillance and Pressure 
Tactics Aimed at Wikileaks and Its Supporters, THE INTERCEPT (Feb. 18, 2014), 
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/18/snowden-docs-reveal-covert-surveillance-and-
pressure-tactics-aimed-at-wikileaks-and-its-supporters/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2015) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 125. William Arkin, NSA Code Names Revealed, WILLIAM M. ARKIN ONLINE (Mar. 13, 
2012), http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2012/03/13/nsa-code-names-revealed/ (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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AIRBAG131 Collection GCHQ program that provides “JTRIG 
Laptop capability for field operations.”132 
Status is listed as “operational.”133 
AIRGAP134 Processing NSA tool that, according to Marc 
Ambinder, serves as a “[p]riority 
missions tool used to determine SIGINT 
gaps.”135 
AIRWOLF136 Collection GCHQ program that collects YouTube 
information and falls under the JTRIG 
program. 
ALLIUM ARCH137 Processing GCHQ program that uses “JTRIG UIA 
via the Tor network.”138 Status is listed 
as “operational.”139  
ANGRY PIRATE140 Attack GCHQ program that “is a tool that will 
permanently disable a target’s account 
on their computer.”141 Status is listed as 
“[r]eady to fire (but see target 
restrictions).”142 
                                                                                                                  
 131. JTRIG Tools and Techniques, THE INTERCEPT (July 14, 2014), 
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/07/14/jtrig-tools-techniques (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Marc Ambinder, An Educated Guess About How the NSA Is Structured, THE 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/08/an-
educated-guess-about-how-the-nsa-is-structured/278697/%20 (last visited Sept. 9, 2015) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); David Somerville, The National 
Security Agency, MINDMEISTER, http://www.mindmeister.com/308518551/the-national-
security-agency-operates-more-than-500-separate-signals-intelligence-platforms-employs-
roughly-30-000-civilians-and-military-budget-10-billion (last visited Sept. 9, 2015) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 135. Ambinder, supra note 134.  
 136. JTRIG Tools and Techniques, supra note 131. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id.  
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ANCESTRY143 Collection GCHQ “tool for discovering the creation 
date of yahoo selectors.”144 Listed as 
“fully operational.”145 
ANCHORY146 Database NSA program that, according to Marc 
Ambinder, is the “[m]ain repository of 
finished NSA SIGINT reports going back 
three years.”147 
ANTICRISIS GIRL148 Collection GCHQ program used to collect user 
information on visitors to WikiLeaks and 
other activist sites.  
ANTO LP PROSS GUI149 Collection NSA remote operations center (RDC) 
that is part of the IRONCHEF attack 
program. 
APERTURE SCIENCE150 Collection NSA collection program that is a parent 
of BOUNDLESSINFORMANT.  
AQUADOR151 Processing NSA program that, according to Marc 
Ambinder, is a “[m]erchant ship tracking 
tool.”152  
ARSON SAM153 Collection GCHQ program that “is a tool to test the 
effect of certain types of PDU SMS 
messages on phones/network. It also 
includes PDU SMS Dumb Fuzz 
Testing.”154 Status is listed as “[r]eady to 
fire,” (not against live targets—this is an 
R&D Tool).155 
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ARTEMIS156 Processing NSA program that performs geospatial 
analysis for an undetermined purpose.  
ARTIFICE157 Collection NSA program that is part of the 
STORMBREW—appears to be a 
codename for an unknown corporate 
partner.  
ASPHAULT158 Collection NSA program that is described as 
“‘Collect it All’ proof-of-concept 
system.”159  
ASSOCIATION160 Database NSA program that, according to Marc 
Ambinder, is a “[t]actical SIGINT social 
network database.”161 
ASTRAL PROJECTION162 Processing JTRIG “[r]emote GSM secure covert 
internet proxy using TOR hidden 
services.”163 Status listed as 
“operational.”164 
AUTOSOURCE165 Collection  
AXLE GREASE166 Collection GCHQ’s “covert banking link for 
CPG.”167 Listed as “operational.”168 
BABYLON169 Collection GCHQ “tool that bulk queries web mail 
addresses and verifies whether they can 
be signed up for. A green tick indicates 
that the address is currently in use. 
Verification can currently be done for 
Hotmail and Yahoo.”170 
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BADGER171 Collection GCHQ program that provides “mass 
delivery of email messaging to support 
an information Operations campaign.”172 
Status is listed as “[r]eady to fire.”173 
BALLOONKNOT174 Collection Listed in “United Kingdom—Collection 
Information” with Validator ID of 
“610210370.”175 
BANYAN176 Database Marc Ambinder describes this as an 
“NSA tactical geospatial correlation 
database.”177 
BEARSCRAPE178 Isolation GCHQ program that “can extract WiFi 
connection history (MAC and timing) 
when supplied with a copy of the registry 
structure or run on the box.”179 
BEARTRAP180 Collection GCHQ program that allows “[b]ulk 
retrieval of public BEBO profiles from 
member or group ID.”181 Status listed as 
“[f]ully operational.”182 
BERRY TWISTER183 Collection GCHQ program that is a “sub-system of 
FRUIT BOWL.”184 Listed as a 
“[p]ilot.”185 
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BERRYTWISTER PLUS186 Collection GCHQ program that is a “sub-system of 
FRUIT BOWL.”187 Listed as a 
“[p]ilot.”188 
BIRDSONG189 Collection GCHQ program that provides 
“[a]utomatic posting of Twitter 
updates.”190 Status listed as “[r]eplaced 
by SYLVESTER.”191 
BIRDSTRIKE192 Collection GCHQ program for “Twitter monitoring 
and profile collection.”193 Status listed as 
“[f]ully operational.”194 
BLACKHEART195 Collection NSA exploit tool that facilitates 
“[c]ollection from an FBI implant.”196 
BLACKPEARL197 Collection Intelligence Analysis Intern used 
BLACKPEARL and “successfully 
located, identified, and submitted 
several new targets . . . .”198 
BLARNEY199 Collection NSA program that “among others, 
filter[s] and gather[s] information at 
major telecommunications 
companies.”200 
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BLUEANCHOR201 Collection A part of an NSA system with “the 
capacity to reach roughly 75% of all U.S. 
Internet traffic in the hunt for foreign 
intelligence, including a wide array of 
communications by foreigners and 
Americans.”202 
BOMBAYROLL203 Collection GCHQ program providing “JTRIG’s 
legacy UIA standalone capability.”204 
Listed as “[o]perational.”205 
BOTANICREALTY206 Collection TEC program “installed at LADYLOVE 
in hopes of locating, identifying, and 




Processing “The focus of [this] internal NSA tool is 
on counting and categorizing the records 
of communications, known as metadata, 
rather than the content of an email or 
instant message.”209 
BRANDYSNAP210 Collection GCHQ program that is a “JTRIG UIA 
contingency at Scarborough.”211 Listed as 
“implementation.”212 
BUFFALOGREEN213 Collection The codename for information shared 
with Poland under the ORANGECRUSH 
system.214 
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BUGSY215 Collection GCHQ program for “Google+ monitoring 
(circles, profiles, etc.).”216 
BULLRUN217 Processing “The agency defines capability as ‘the 
NSA/CSS ability to exploit a specific 
technology,’ according to a 2010 
document outlining the Bullrun 
program. Here, the agency is claiming 
that it can gain access to the text and 
audio of an Internet chat service. It is 
unclear from the documents that The 
New York Times and ProPublica have 
access to which service this document 
refers to.”218 
BUMBLEBEEDANCE219 Collection GCHQ’s “JTRIG Operational VM/TOR 
architecture.”220 Listed as 
“[o]perational.”221 
BUMPERCAR+222 Attack GCHQ program that “is an automated 
system by JTRIG CITD to support 
BUMPERCAR operations. 
BUMPERCAR operations are used to 
disrupt and deny Internet-based terror 
videos or other material. The technique 
employs the services provided by upload 
providers to report offensive 
materials.”223 Status listed as “[r]eady to 
fire.”224 
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BURLESQUE225 Attack GCHQ program that provides the 
“capability to send spoofed SMS text 
messages.”226 Status is listed as “[r]eady 
to fire.”227 
BYSTANDER228 Database GCHQ “categorisation database accessed 
via web service.”229 
CANDYGRAM230 Collection NSA program that “[t]ypical use 
scenarios are asset validation, target 
tracking and identification as well as 
identifying hostile surveillance units 
with GSM handsets.”231 
CANNONBALL232 Attack GCHQ program that provides the 
“capability to send repeated text 
messages to a single target.”233 Status 
listed as “[r]eady to fire.”234 
CAPTIVATEDAUDIENC235 Collection An NSA implant plug-in that “is used to 
take over a targeted computer’s 
microphone and record conversations 
taking place near the device.”236 
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CARBOY237 Collection A collection station in Bude, England 
that “intercept[s] high-priority 
communications traffic moving through 
communications satellites parked over 
the Atlantic.”238 
CASPORT239 Processing NSA program that grants “access to NSA 
Establishment FISA data.”240 
CASTANET241 Collection An “NSA document shows what appears 
to be an SCS antenna system with the 
code name ‘Einstein’ and its 
corresponding control device 
‘Castanet.’”242 
CCDP243 Collection “[C]alled the Communications 
Capabilities Development Programme.” 
“Under the scheme the security services 
would be granted ‘real time’ access to 
phone and internet records of people 
they want to put under surveillance, as 
well as the ability to reconstruct their 
movements through the information 
stored in the databases.”244 
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CERBERUS245 Collection GCHQ program that is “JTRIG’s legacy 
UIA desktop, soon to be replaced by 




Collection GCHQ program that “[c]ollects on-going 
usage information about how many 
users utilize JTRIG’s UIA capability, 
what sites are the most frequently 
visited etc. This is in order to provide 
JTRIG infrastructure and ITServices 
management information statistics.”249 
Status is listed as “operational.”250 
CHANGELING251 Isolation GCHQ program that provides the 
“[a]bility to spoof any email address and 
send email under that identity.”252 
CHINESEFIRECRACKER
253 
Attack GCHQ program that provides “[o]vert 
brute login attempts against online 
forums.”254 Status is listed as “[r]eady to 
fire.”255 
CHIPPEWA256 Processing A repository for written reports when 
“the identity of a U.S. person is found in 
the raw SIGINT.”257 
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CIMBRI258 Processing NSA program with which “the agency 
filters the communications that needed 
more attention.”259 
CLEANSWEEP260 Attack GCHQ program that allows 
“[m]asquerade Facebook Wall Posts for 
individuals or entire countries.”261 Status 
listed as “[r]eady to fire (SIGINT sources 
required).”262 
CLUMSYBEEKEEPER263 None GCHQ program that is simply described 
as “[s]ome work in progress to 
investigate IRC effects.”264 Status is 
listed as “NOT READY TO FIRE.”265 
CONCRETEDONKEY266 Attack GCHQ program that has “the capability 
to scatter an audio message to a large 
number of telephones, or repeatedly 
bomb a target number with the same 
message.”267 Status is listed as “[i]n 
development.”268 
CONDUIT269 Database GCHQ “database of C2C identifiers for 
Intelligence Community assets acting 
online, either under alias or in real 
name.”270 
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OCTAVE/ 
CONTRAOACTAVE271 
Collection NSA program that Marc Ambinder 
describes as a “[c]ollection mission 
tasking tool.”272 
CONVEYANCE273 Processing One of two NSA programs that “appear 
to be a final layer of filtering to reduce 
the intake of information about 
Americans.”274 
CORALREEF275 Database NSA database involved with 
“Cryptovariable Management.”276 
CO TRAVELER277 Collection “[The NSA] collects locations in bulk 
because its most powerful analytic 
tools—known collectively as 
CO-TRAVELER—allow it to look for 
unknown associates of known 
intelligence targets by tracking people 
whose movements intersect.”278 
“CO-TRAVELER and related tools 
require the methodical collection and 
storage of location data on what amounts 
to a planetary scale.”279 
COUNTRYFILE280 Collection GCHQ “sub-system of JAZZ 
FUSION.”281 Listed as “operational.”282 
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CRISSCROSS283 Database An “older top-secret data sharing system 
named CRISSCROSS/PROTON, which 
was launched in the 1990s and managed 
by the CIA.”284 
CROSSEYEDSLOTH285 Collection Listed in “United Kingdom—Collection 
Information” with Validator IDs of 
“610209553” and “610209558.”286 
CRYOSTAT287 Isolation GCHQ program that “is a JTRIG tool 
that runs against data held in NEWPIN. 
It then displays this data in a chart to 
show links between targets.”288 
CUSTOMS289 Unknown NSA exploit tool described only as 




Processing GCHQ “centralised suite of tools, 
statistics and viewers for tracking 
current operations across the Cyber 
community.”292 
DANCINGBEAR293 Collection GCHQ program that “obtains the 
locations of WiFi access points.”294 
Status is listed as “fully operational.”295 
DANCINGOASIS296 Unknown Listed in NSA documents as “DGOT 
(metadata TOGD)-US-3171 
(DACINGOASIS 13 MAR 2012” and 
“DGOD (metadata DOGD)-US-3717 
(DANCINGOASIS) 13 Mar 2012.”297 
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DAREDEVIL298 Attack Listed in NSA documents as an 
“Implant/Shooter,” along with 
STRAIGHTBIZARRE.299 
DARKFIRE300 Collection Listed in “United Kingdom—Collection 
Information,” with Validator ID of 
“610208689.”301 
DARKQUEST302 Processing Listed in NSA documents under “know it 
all” bubble of “New Collection 
Posture.”303 
DARKTHUNDER304 Attack According to NSA documents, this is “[a] 
SIGAD used for TAO, and thus 
QUANTUM, FOXACID, and the like.”305 
DEADPOOL306 Isolation GCHQ Program that serves as a “URL 
shortening service.”307 
DEER STALKER308 Isolation GCHQ program that provides the 
“[a]bility to aid geolocation of Sat 
Phones/GSM Phones via a silent calling 
to the phone.”309 Status listed as “[r]eady 
to fire.”310 
DEVILS HANDSHAKE311 Collection GCHQ program that is described as an 
“ECI Data Technique.”312 Status is listed 
as “fully operational.”313 
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DEWSWEEPER314 Isolation NSA exploit tool that is described as 
“USB (Universal Serial Bus) hardware 
host tap that provides COVERT link 
over US link into a target network. 
Operates w/RF relay subsystem to 
provide wireless Bridge into target 
network.”315 
DIALD316 Collection GCHQ program that is an “external 
Internet Redial and Monitor Daemon.”317 
Listed as “operational.”318 
DIKTER319 N/A The “SIGINT Exchange designator” for 
Norway.320 
DIRTYDEVIL321 Collection GCHQ program that is “JTRIG’s 
research network.”322 Listed as 
“design.”323 
DISCOROUTE324 Collection NSA “tool specifically designed to suck 
up and database router configuration 
files seen in passively collected telnet 
sessions.”325 
DISHFIRE326 Database “SMS data is flowing into DISHFIRE.”327 
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DISTANTFOCUS328 Collection NSA program described as a pod that “is 
[a] new system for tactical SIGINT and 
precision geolocation . . . first deployed in 
December (S).”329 
DISTILLERY330 Processing Tactical Collection 
System . . . . “Stream-based platform for 
executing hacking identification 
applications.”331 
DOGHANDLER332 Collection GCHQ program that is “JTRIG’s 
development network.”333 Listed as 
“design.”334 
DRAGGABLEKITTEN335 Processing NSA program that is described as “an 
XKEYSCORE Map/Reduce analytic that 
leverages the packets collected and made 
accessible to analytics by XKEYSCORE 
DEEPDIVE systems. 
DRAGGABBLEKITTEN identifies the 
QUANTUMTHEORY keywords in a 
packet capture and generates statistics 
for each service (currently Hotmail and 
Yahoo) to determine how often all of the 
keywords occur within a single 
packet.”336 
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DROPMIRE337 Collection NSA exploit tool that is described as 
both “[p]assive collection of emanations 
using antenna” and “[l]aser printer 
collection, purely proximal access 
(***NOT*** implanted).”338 
DRUID339 Processing NSA designator that indicates 
information should be “shared with third 
parties, countries with NATO or defense 
treaty relationships with the United 
States.”340 
DYNAMO341 N/A The “SIGINT Exchange designator” for 
Denmark.342 
EINSTEIN343 Collection A publicized DHS and NSA collaborative 
program that “called for 
telecommunications companies to route 
the Internet traffic of civilian agencies 
through a monitoring box that would 
search for and block computer codes 
designed to penetrate or otherwise 
compromise networks.”344 
ELATE345 Collection A GCHQ “suite of tools for monitoring 
target use of the UK auction site eBay 
(www.ebay.co.uk). These tools are hosted 
on an Internet server, and the results 
are retrieved by encrypted email.”346 
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ELEGANTCHAOS347 Processing NSA program for “[a]nalysis of data at 
scale.”348 
ENDUE349 Database NSA database where “some decrypts are 
placed . . . due to the sensitivity or 
fragility of the exploitation capability.”350 
EVENINGEASEL351 Collection “The NSA conducts its surveillance of 
telephone conversations and text 
messages transmitted through Mexico’s 
cell phone network under [this] internal 
code name.”352 This program was 
claimed to have been used to directly spy 
on the Mexican president.  
EVILOLIVE353 Collection NSA program that “capture[s] sensitive 
internet metadata—such as email logs, 
web browsing histories, and IP 
addresses, which can reveal location 
information—but not the content of 
email communications.”354 
EXCALIBUR355 Collection GCHQ program that facilitates “Paltalk 
group chat collection.”356 Status listed as 
“beta release.”357 
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EXPOW358 Processing “GCHQ’s UIA capability provided by 
JTRIG.”359 Listed as “operational.”360 
FAIRVIEW361 Collection NSA program that, “among others, 
filter[s] and gather[s] information at 
major telecommunications 
companies.”362 
FALLOUT363 Processing One of two NSA programs that “appear 
to be a final layer of filtering to reduce 
the intake of information about 
Americans.”364 
FASCIA365 Database “The SMS data is flowing into 
DISHFIRE and the corresponding call 
event data into FASCIA.”366 
FASHIONCLEFT367 Unknown Found on an NSA slide with the 
explanation “Wrapped Exfil.”368 
FAST SCOPE369 Database Listed on an NSA slide—“If the S2 QFD 
Review Panel elects to ask for HOMING 
PIGEON to be made persistent, its 
natural home would be incorporation 
into FAST SCOPE.”370 
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FATYAK371 Collection GCHQ program that is used for “public 
data collection from Linkedin [sic].”372 
Status listed as “in development.”373 
FOGGYBOTTOM374 Collection This NSA program “records logs of 
Internet browsing histories and collects 
login details and passwords used to 
access websites and email accounts.”375 
FORESTWARRIOR376 Processing GCHQ program that will be part of 
“JTRIG’s new infrastructure”377 serving 
as a “[d]esktop replacement for 
CERBERUS.”378 Status listed as 
“design.”379 
FOXACID380 Attack “SECONDDATE can ‘influence real-time 
communications between client and 
server’ and to ‘quietly redirect 
web-browsers’ to NSA malware servers 
called FOXACID.”381 
FRONTO382 N/A Listed as one of “[o]ther SIGINT 
Exchange Designators with Third and 
Fourth Parties.”383 
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FRUIT BOWL384 Processing GCHQ program that is a “CEREBERUS 
UIA Replacement and new tools 
infrastructure—Primary Domain for 
Generic User/Tools Access and TOR split 
into 3 sub-systems.”385 Listed as in 
“design.”386 
FUSEWIRE387 Collection GCHQ program that “provides 24/7 
monitoring of Vbulliten forums for target 
postings/online activity. Also allows 
staggered postings to be made.”388 Status 
not indicated.389 
GAMBIT390 Collection GCHQ “[d]eployable pocket-sized proxy 
server.”391 Status listed as 
“[i]n-development.”392 
GARLICK393 Collection System with “which the NSA monitored 
satellite communication out of the 
Bavarian town of Bad Aibling for 
years.”394 
GATEWAY395 Attack GCHQ program that provides the 
“[a]bility to artificially increase traffic to 
a website.”396 Status listed as “[r]eady to 
fire.”397 
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GENIE398 Collection NSA exploit tool that is a “multi-stage 
operation: jumping the airgap etc.”399 
GESTATOR400 Isolation GCHQ program that provides 
“amplification of a given message, 
normally video, on popular multimedia 
websites (youtube).”401 Status is not 
listed.402 
GHOSTMACHINE403 Collection “NSA’s Special Source Operations cloud 
analytics platform.”404 
GILGAMESH405 Collection Described in NSA documents as the 
“NSA geolocation system used by JSOC 
[Joint Special Operations Command].”406 
GLASSBACK407 Attack GCHQ program that uses “technique of 
getting a target’s IP address by 
pretending to be a spammer and ringing 
them. Target does not need to 
answer.”408 Status listed as “fully 
operational.”409 
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GLITTERBALL410 Isolation GCHQ program that provides “Online 
Gaming Capabilities for Sensitive 
Operations. Currently Second Life.”411 
Status is listed as “[i]n development.”412 
GODFATHER413 Collection GCHQ program that facilitates “[p]ublic 
data collection from Facebook.”414 Status 
listed as “[f]ully operational.”415 
GOODFELLA416 Collection GCHQ program that is a “[g]eneric 
framework for public data collection 
from Online Social Networks.”417 Status 
listed as “[i]n development.”418 
GRANDMASTER419 Processing DNI processing system, which has 
evolved “from GRANDMASTER to 
WEALTHYCLUSTER, and in the future, 
TURMOIL.”420 
GROK421 Collection NSA program “used to log 
keystrokes.”422 
GUMFISH423 Collection NSA program that “can covertly take 
over a computer’s webcam and snap 
photographs.”424 
GURKHAS SWORD425 Isolation GCHQ program that consists of 
“[b]eaconed Microsoft Office Documents 
to elicit a targets [sic] IP address.”426 
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HACIENDA427 Processing GCHQ program that “is a port scanning 
tool designed to scan an entire country 
or city. It uses GEOFUSION to identify 
IP locations.”428 
HAPPYFOOT429 Processing NSA program that “helps the NSA to 
map Internet addresses to physical 
locations more precisely than is possible 
with traditional Internet geolocation 
services.”430 
HAVOK431 Isolation GCHQ program that provides a 
“[r]eal-time website cloning technique 
allowing on-the-fly alterations.”432 
HEADMOVIES433 Collection Listed as “United Kingdom—Collection 
Information” with Validator ID of 
“6210000230.”434 
HIGHCASTLE435 Processing “[F]or voice processing and analysis and 
reporting.”436 
HIGHLANDS437 Collection NSA exploit tool that, according to Bruce 
Schneier, involves “[c]ollection from 
Implants.”438 
HOMEBASE439 Isolation NSA program that, according to Marc 
Ambinder, is a “[t]actical tasking tool for 
digital network identification.”440 
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HOME PORTAL441 Unknown GCHQ “central hub for all JTRIG 
Cerberus tools.”442 
HOMING PIGEON443 Unknown Listed in NSA documents as follows: “If 
the S2 QFD Review Panel elects to ask 
for HOMING PIGEON to be made 
persistent, its natural home would be 
incorporation into FASTSCOPE.”444 
HUSK445 Isolation GCHQ program that provides a “[s]ecure 
one-to-one web based dead-drop 
messaging platform.”446 
ICE447 Collection GCHQ program that “is an advance IP 
harvesting technique.”448 Status is not 
listed.449 
ICREACH450 Processing NSA program described as follows: 
“ICREACH contains information on the 
private communications of foreigners 
and, it appears, millions of records on 
American citizens who have not been 
accused of any wrongdoing.”451 Often 
referred to as “Google-like.”452 
IMPERIALBARGE453 Attack GCHQ program “[f]or connecting two 
target phone[s] together in a call.”454 
Status is listed as “[t]ested.”455 
INDRA456 Unknown Listed in NSA documents under 
“FORNSAT 1.”457 
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INSPECTOR458 Collection GCHQ “tool for monitoring domain 
information and site availability.”459 
Status listed as “fully operational.”460 
INTERQUAKE461 Collection “Terrestrial Environmental Knowledge 
Base. Available to all NSA analysts and 
partners.”462 
IRONSAND463 Unknown Listed in NSA documents under 
“FORNSAT 1.”464 
ISHTAR465 N/A The “SIGINT Exchange designator” for 
Japan.466 
JACKKNIFE467 Unknown Listed in NSA documents under 
“FORNSAT 1.”468 
JAZZ FUSION469 Database GCHQ program that is a 
“BOMBAYROLL Replacement which 
will also incorporate new collectors—
Primary Domain for Dedicated 
Connections split into 3 sub-systems.”470 
Listed as “implementation.”471 
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JEDI472 Unknown This is a GCHQ program or object. The 
description provided states: “JTRIG will 
shortly be rolling out a JEDI pod to 
every desk of every member of an 
intelligence Production Team. The 
challenge is to scale up to over 1,200 
users whilst remaining agile, efficent 
[sic] and responsive to customer 
needs.”473 
JTRIG474 N/A This is a GCHQ collection of “[t]ools and 
techniques . . . developed by various 
teams.”475 One of the largest collections 
of tools of all types.  
JTRIG RADIANT 
SPLENDOUR476 
Collection GCHQ “‘Data Diode’” connecting the 
CERBERUS network with GCNET.”477 
Status listed as “operational.”478 
JUGGERNAUT479 Collection “NSA has been forwarding SMS data 
from it’s [sic] JUGGERNAUT GSM 
collection platform since 2007.”480 
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KOALAPUNCH481 Collection Listed in “United Kingdom—Collection 
Information” with Validator ID of 
“610210091.”482 
LADYLOVE483 Processing “Automatically processes . . . signals of 
interest” from BOTANICREALTY.484 
LANDINGPARTY485 Processing GCHQ “tool for auditing dissemination 
of VIKING PILLAGE data.”486 Status 
listed as “fully operational.”487 
LIFESAVER488 Collection NSA exploit tool that provides “[i]maging 
of the [h]ard [d]rive.”489 
LITHIUM490 Collection NSA program that “among others, 
filter[s] and gather[s] information at 
major telecommunications 
companies.”491 
LOCKSTOCK492 Collection NSA program described as “[a]n eight-
year, $51 million contract to process ‘all 
MYSTIC data and data for other NSA 
accesses’ at a facility in Annapolis 
Junction, Maryland, down the road from 
NSA’s headquarters.”493 
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LONGRUN494 Collection Joint GCHQ/NSA program described as 
a “[d]ata reconnaissance tool developed 
by the CITD team in JTRIG[,] Port 
Scans entire countries[,] [u]ses nmap as 
port scanning tool[,] [u]ses GEOGUSION 
for IP Geolocation[,] [r]andomly scans 
every IP identified for that country.”495 
LONGSHOT496 Collection GCHQ “[f]ile-upload and sharing 
website.”497 
LOPERS498 Unknown Described only as “40.940, 994, 147 
Records.”499 
LUMP500 Isolation GCHQ “system that finds the avatar 
name from a SecondLife AgentID.”501 
LUTEUSICARUS502 Collection Listed as “United Kingdom—Collection 
Information” with a validator ID of 
“100033767.”503 
MAGNETIC504 Collection According to Bruce Schneier, this NSA 
exploit tool involves the “Sensor 
Collection of Magnetic Emanations.”505 
MAGNUMOPUS506 Collection Listed in “United Kingdom—Collection 
Information” with Validator ID of 
“100032919” and “611000994.”507 
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MAIN CORE508 Database NSA database that “reportedly collects 
and stores vast amounts of personal and 
financial data about millions of 
Americans.”509 
MAINWAY510 Database According to Marc Ambinder, this is an 
NSA “[t]elephony metadata collection 
database.”511 The SCISSORS program 
“sort[s] data types for analysis in 
NUCLEON (voice), PINWALE (video), 
MAINWAY (call records), and MARINA 
(Internet records).”512 
MARINA513 Database Marc Ambinder describes this as an 
“Internet metadata collection 
database.”514 The SCISSORS program 
“sort[s] data types for analysis in 
NUCLEON (voice), PINWALE (video), 
MAINWAY (call records), and MARINA 
(Internet records).”515 
MESSIAH/WHAMI516 Database According to Marc Ambinder, this NSA 
program is an “[e]lectronic intelligence 
processing and analytical database.”517 
METROTUBE518 Processing Described on an NSA slide simply as 
“[a]nalytic.”519 
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MIDDLEMAN520 Processing GCHQ “distributed real-time event 
aggregation, tip-off and tasking platform 
utilized by JTRIG as a middleware 
layer.”521 
MINERALIZE522 Collection NSA exploit tool that provides 
“[c]ollection from LAN implant.”523 
MINIATURE HERO524 Collection GCHQ program the provides “[a]ctive 
[S]kype capability. Provision of real time 
call records (SkypeOut and 
SkypetoSkype) and bidirectional instant 
messaging. Also contact lists.”525 Status 
is listed as “fully operational, but note 
usage restrictions.”526 
MIRAGE527 Unknown Unknown. 
MOBILEHOOVER528 Isolation GCHQ “tool to extract data from field 
forensics’ reports created by Celidek, 
Cellegrite, XRY, Snoopy and USIM 
detective. These reports are transposed 
into a Newpin XML format to upload to 
Newpin.”529 
MOLTEN-MAGMA530 Collection GCHQ program that is a “CGI HTTP 
Proxy with ability to log all traffic and 
perform HTTPS Man in the Middle.”531 
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MONSTERMIND532 Attack NSA program that is described as “an 
automatic strike-back system for 
cyberattacks. The program, disclosed 
here for the first time, would automate 
the process of hunting for the beginnings 
of a foreign cyberattack. Software would 
constantly be on the lookout for traffic 
patterns indicating known or suspected 
attacks. When it detected an attack, 
MonsterMind would automatically block 
it from entering the country—a ‘kill’ in 
cyber terminology. Programs like this 
had existed for decades, but 
MonsterMind software would add a 
unique new capability: Instead of simply 
detecting and killing the malware at the 
point of entry, MonsterMind would 
automatically fire back, with no human 
involvement.”533 
MOONLIGHTPATH534 Collection Part of a “joint surveillance collection 
operation with an unnamed partner 
agency yielded a new program ‘to query 
metadata’ that was ‘turned on in the Fall 
2012.’ Two others, called MoonLightPath 
and Spinneret, ‘are planned to be added 
by September 2013.’”535 
MOONPENNY536 Unknown Listed under “FORNSTAT 1.”537 
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MOUTH538 Collection GCHQ program that serves as a “[t]ool 
for collection for downloading a user’s 
files from archive.org.”539 Status is listed 
as “[f]ully operational.”540 
MTI541 Collection A joint NSA/GCHQ program that stands 
for “Mastering the Internet—[was 
created] to collect a significant amount of 
the world’s communications.”542 
MUGSHOT543 Processing “[W]ith MUGSHOT the GCHQ 
integrates results from active scans 
(HACIENDA) as well as passive 
monitoring (Figure 26), to ‘understand 
everything important about all machines 
on the Internet.’”544 
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MUSCULAR545 Collection  A “GCHQ special source access.”546 This 
is part of the NSA’s WINDSTOP project, 
and “is used to break in to the internal 
‘cloud’ networks of Google and Yahoo 
which goes by the alphanumeric 
designator DS-200B.”547 
MUSKETEER548 Collection NSA program that feeds 
SHELLTRUMPET and is listed as a 
“Second Party system[].”549 
MUSTANG550 Collection GCHQ program that “provides covert 
access to the locations of GSM cell 
towers.”551 Status is listed as “[f]ully 
operational.”552 
MYSTIC553 Collection An NSA SSO “SHELLTRUMPET is 
currently processing Two Billion call 
events/day from select SSO (Ram-M, 
OAKSTAR, MYSTIC and NCSC enabled 
systems).”554 
                                                                                                                  
 545. Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data 
Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-
data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d7 
14ca4dd_story.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 546. The NSA in Germany: Snowden’s Documents Available for Download, supra note 
122. 
 547. One Month, Hundreds of Millions of Records Collected, WASH. POST, 
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/one-month-hundreds-of-millions-of-records-
collected/554/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 548. GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 100. 
 549. Id. 
 550. JTRIG Tools and Techniques, supra note 131. 
 551. Id. 
 552. Id. 
 553. GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 100. 
 554. Id. 
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NAMEJACKER555 Isolation GCHQ program that is a “web service 
and admin console for the translation of 
usernames between networks. For use 
with gateways and other such 
technologies.”556 
NCSC557 Collection An NSA SSO “SHELLTRUMPET is 
currently processing Two Billion call 
events/day from select SSO (Ram-M, 
OAKSTAR, MYSTIC and NCSC enabled 
systems).”558 
NEVIS559 Isolation GCHQ “tool developed by NTAC to 
search disk images for signs of possible 
Encryption products. CMA have further 
developed this tool to look for signs of 
Steganography.”560 
NEWPIN561 Database A GCHQ “database of C2C identifiers 
obtained from a variety of unique 
sources, and a suite of tools for exploring 
this data.”562 
NIAGARAFILES563 Processing Listed in “‘Real Time’ Analytics” and is 
“filed based” and “starting to gain 
experience.”564 
NIGHTCRAWLER565 Collection GCHQ program that is a “[p]ublic online 
group against dodgy websites.”566 
                                                                                                                  
 555. JTRIG Tools and Techniques, supra note 131. 
 556. Id. 
 557. GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 100. 
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 559. JTRIG Tools and Techniques, supra note 131. 
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NKB567 Collection Intelligence Analysis Intern used 
BLACKPEARL and “successfully 
located, identified, and submitted 
several new targets.”568  
NUCLEON569 Database NSA database that, according to Marc 
Ambinder, is a “[g]lobal telephone 
content database.”570 The SCISSORS 
program “sort[s] data types for analysis 
in NUCLEON (voice), PINWALE (video), 
MAINWAY (call records), and MARINA 
(Internet records).”571 
NUTALLERGY572 Collection GCHQ program that serves as a “JTRIG 
Tor web browser—Sandbox IE 
replacement and FRUITBOWL 
sub-system.”573 Listed as a “pilot.”574 
NYMROD575 Processing NYMROD is a “name matching system” 
that “can accept queries consisting of 
personal names.”576 
OAKSTAR577 Collection An NSA SSO “SHELLTRUMPET is 
currently processing Two Billion call 
events/day from select SSO (Ram-M, 
OAKSTAR, MYSTIC and NCSC enabled 
systems).”578 
                                                                                                                  
 567. The NSA in Germany: Snowden’s Documents Available for Download, supra note 
122. 
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 569. Barton Gellman, U.S. Surveillance Architecture Includes Collection of Revealing 
Internet, Phone Metadata, WASH. POST (June 15, 2013) https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
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14, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 570. Id.; Ambinder, supra note 134; Somerville, supra note 134.  
 571. NSA Slides Explain the PRISM Data-Collection Program, supra note 273. 
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 573. Id. 
 574. Id. 
 575. Content Extraction Analytics, CTR. FOR CONTENT EXTRACTION (2009), 
http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34089.pdf. 
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 577. GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 100. 
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OCEAN579 Collection NSA exploit tool that provides “[o]ptical 
[c]ollection [s]ystem for Raster-Based 
[c]omputer [s]creens.”580 
OCTAVE581 Collection NSA program described as a “[c]ollection 
mission tasking tool.”582 
OILSTOCK583 Collection Marc Ambinder claims that this is an 
“Air Force/Navy tool to track ships in 
real time.”584 
OLYMPIA585 Processing NSA program described as “CSEC’s 
Network Knowledge Engine,” “[v]arious 
data sources,” “[c]hained enrichments,” 
and “[a]utomated analysis.”586 
ONEROOF587 Database NSA database that, according to Marc 
Ambinder, is the “[m]ain tactical 
SIGINT database (Afghanistan), 
consisting of raw and unfiltered 
intercepts.”588 
OPTICNERVE589 Collection A GCHQ program that “collected still 
images of Yahoo webcam chats in bulk 
and saved them to agency databases, 
regardless of whether individual users 
were an intelligence target or not.”590 
ORANGEBLOSSOM591 Unknown Listed in NSA slides as having “DNR 
capability.”592 
                                                                                                                  
 579. Schneier, supra note 195. 
 580. Id. 
 581. Ambinder, supra note 134. 
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 584. Id. 
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 589. Spencer Ackerman & James Ball, Optic Nerve: Millions of Yahoo Webcam Images 
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ORANGECRUSH593 Collection NSA program that, as “part of the 
OAKSTAR program under SSO’s 
corporate portfolio, began forwarding 
metadata from a third party partner  
site (Poland) to NSA repositories as of 3 
March and content as of 25 March. This 
program is a collaborative effort between 
SSO, NCSC, ETC, FAD, an NSA  
Corporate Partner and a division of the 
Polish Government. ORANGECRUSH is 
only known to the Poles as 
BUFFALOGREEN. This multi-group 
partnership began in May 2009 and will 
incorporate the OAKSTAR project of 
ORANGEBLOSSOM and its DNR 
capability. The new access will provide 
SIGINT from commercial links managed 
by the NSA Corporate Partner and is 
anticipated to include Afghan National 
Army, Middle East, limited African 
continent, and European 
communications. A notification has been 
posted to SPRINGRAY and this 
collection is available to Second Parties 
via TICKETWINDOW.”594 
OSN595 Collection NSA social media collection and life 
mapping tool. Slides indicate reasons to 
use this as “Targets increasing usage of 
Facebook, BEBO, MySpace etc. . . . A 
very rich source of information on 
targets: . . . Personal details . . . ‘Pattern 
of Life’ . . . Connections to associates . . . 
Media.”596 
OUTWARD597 Processing GCHQ “collection of DNS lookup, 
WHOIS Lookup and other network 
tools.”598 
                                                                                                                  
 593. Id. 
 594. Id. 
 595. Id. at 161. 
 596. Id. 
 597. JTRIG Tools and Techniques, supra note 131. 
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PACKAGEDGOODS599 Processing NSA program that “tracks the 
‘traceroutes’ through which data flows 
around the Internet. Through Packaged 
Goods, the N.S.A. has gained access to 
‘13 covered servers in unwitting data 
centers around the globe,’ according to 
the PowerPoint. The document identifies 
a list of countries where the data centers 
are located, including Germany, Poland, 
Denmark, South Africa and Taiwan as 
well as Russia, China and Singapore.”600 
PANOPLY601 Processing “[P]opulates IQ with emitter information 
and reports including: signal externals, 
radio and payload information, LACs 
and cell ID’s, protocol stacks.”602 
PARCHDUSK603 Collection From an NSA slide in collaboration with 
the Texas Cryptologic Center, listed as a 
Production Operation. Der Spiegel 
describes this program as follows: 
“Operations using the OLYMPUS 
spyware during the 2007 and 2008 fiscal 
years, FOXACID spam operations, and 
operations with the spying programs 
SHARPFOCUS and PARCHDUSK.”604 
PBX605 Unknown NSA program described as “Public 
Branch Exchange Switch.”606 
                                                                                                                  
 599. James Risen & Laura Poitras, NSA Report Outlined Goals for More Power, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/us/politics/nsa-report-outlined-
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Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 600. Id. 
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Review). 
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PHOTONTORPEDO607 Attack GCHQ program that is “[a] technique to 
actively grab the IP address of an MSN 
messenger user.”608 Status is listed as 
“[o]perational, but usage restrictions.”609 
PICASSO610 Isolation NSA device that is a “Modified GSM 
(target) handset that collects user data, 
location information and room audio. 
Command and data exfil is done from a 
laptop and regular phone via SMS (Short 
Messaging Service), without alerting the 
target.”611 
PINWALE612 Database NSA program that is described as an 
“Internet data content database.”613 
“[P]ersona session collection (where the 
data is collected and forwarded to NSA’s 
PINWALE . . . ).”614 The SCISSORS 
program “sort[s] data types for analysis 
in NUCLEON (voice), PINWALE (video), 
MAINWAY (call records), and MARINA 
(Internet records).”615 
PISTRIX616 Collection GCHQ program that is an “image 
hosting and sharing website.”617 
PODRACE618 Collection GCHQ program that is “JTRIG’s MS 
update farm.”619 Status is listed as 
“design.”620 
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PREDATORSFACE621 Attack GCHQ program that provides “Targeted 
Denial Of Service against Web 
Servers.”622 Status is not listed.623 
PREFER624 Collection This NSA “program uses automated text 
messages such as missed call alerts or 
texts sent with international roaming 
charges to extract information, which 
the agency describes as ‘content-derived 
metadata,’ and explains that ‘such gems 
are not in current metadata stores and 
would enhance current analytics.’ 
On average, each day the NSA was able 
to extract: 
• More than 5 million missed-call alerts, 
for use in contact-chaining analysis 
(working out someone’s social network 
from who they contact and when) 
• Details of 1.6 million border crossings 
a day, from network roaming alerts 
• More than 110,000 names, from 
electronic business cards, which also 
included the ability to extract and save 
images. 
• Over 800,000 financial transactions, 
either through text-to-text payments or 
linking credit cards to phone users.”625 
PRESSUREWAVE626 Database Described on a NSA slide as being fed 
“IKE Full take metadata (files)” and 
“Selected Decrypted Content” from 
“TURMOIL.”627 
PRIMATE628 Processing  GCHQ “JTRIG tool that aims to provides 
[sic] the capability to identify trends in 
seized computer media data and 
metadata.”629 
                                                                                                                  
 621. Id. 
 622. Id. 
 623. Id. 
 624. Ball, supra note 97.  
 625. Id. 
 626. Gallagher & Greenwald, supra note 235. 
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PRINTAURA630 Collection NSA program that is part of PRISM, this 
“automates the traffic flow.”631 
PRISM632 Collection “PRISM is the most cited collection 
source in NSA 1st Party end-product 
reporting. More NSA product reports 
were based on PRISM than on any other 
single SIGAD for all of NSA’s 1st Party 
reporting during FY12: cited in 15.1% of 
all reports (up from 14% in FYll). PRISM 
was cited in 13.4% of all 1st, 2nd, and 
3rd Party NSA reporting (up from 11.9% 
in FYll), and is also the top cited SIGAD 
overall.”633 “PRISM is a tool used by the 
[NSA] to collect private electronic data 
belonging to URLs [uniform resource 
locator] of major internet services like 
Gmail, Facebook, Outlook, and 
others.”634 “Material collected through 
Prism is routinely shared with the FBI 
and CIA, with one NSA document 
describing the program as a ‘team 
sport.’”635 The NSA’s Special Source 
Operations (SSO) division is responsible 
for all programs directed at U.S. 
communications systems through 
corporate partnerships like PRISM.636 
The sharing between the NSA, the FBI 
and the CIA has automated aspects that 
“enable[] [them] to see which selectors 
[search terms] the National Security 
Agency has tasked to Prism.”637 
                                                                                                                  
 630. GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 116. 
 631. Id.; NSA Slides Explain the PRISM Data-Collection Program, supra note 273. 
 632. GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 111. 
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PROTON638 Database NSA database that is described by Marc 
Ambinder as “SIGINT database for 
time-sensitive 
targets/counterintelligence.”639 
QUANTUMBISCUIT640 Attack Listed as a joint NSA/GCHQ tool for 
“[r]edirection based on keywork” and 
“Mostly HTML Cookie Values.”641 
QUANTUMBOT642 Attack Listed as a joint NSA/GCHQ tool for 
“IRC botnet hijacking.”643 
QUANTUMCOPPER644 Attack  Listed as a joint NSA/GCHQ tool for 
“[f]ile download disruption.”645 
QUANTUMDNS646 Attack Listed as a joint NSA/GCHQ tool for 
“DNS Hijacking” and “Caching 
Nameservers.”647 
QUANTUMSQUIRREL648 Isolation Listed as a joint NSA/GCHQ tool for 
“[t]ruly covert infrastructure, be any IP 
in the world.”649 
QUINCY650 Processing GCHQ program that “is an enterprise 
level suite of tools for the exploitation of 
seized media.”651 
RADON652 Attack NSA exploit tool that provides 
“[b]i-directional host tap that can inject 
Ethernet packets onto the same targets. 
Allows bi-directional exploitation of 
denied networks using standard on-net 
tools.”653 
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RAM-M654 Unknown Described in NSA documents in the 
following sentence: “SHELLTRUMPET 
is currently processing Two Billion call 
events/day from select SSO (Ram-M, 
OAKSTAR, MYSTIC and NCSC enabled 
systems).”655 
RAMPART-T656 Collection NSA program that “has to do with 
penetration of hard targets at or near 
the leadership level, in other words: 
heads of state and their closest aides.”657 
RANA658 Unknown GCHQ “system developed by ICTR-CISA 
providing CAPTCHA-solving via a web 
service on CERBERUS. This is intended 
for use by BUMPERCAR+ and possibly 
in future by SHORTFALL but anyone is 
welcome to use it.”659 
RC-10660 Collection NSA program “that increased the 
agency’s capacity to suck up and process 
all-source communications intelligence 
by a factor of 10.”661 
REAPER662 Collection GCHQ’s “Cerberus-> GCNET Import 
Gateway Interface System.”663 Listed as 
“operational.”664 
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 656. Laura Poitras, Marcel Rosenbach & Holger Stark, Codename ‘Apachee’: How 
America Spies on Europe and the UN, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Aug. 26, 2013),  
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/secret-nsa-documents-show-how-the-us-spies-
on-europe-and-the-un-a-918625.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 657. Id. 
 658. JTRIG Tools and Techniques, supra note 131. 
 659. Id. 
 660. Marc Ambinder, The Quick Read: Obama’s Wars, by Bob Woodward, THE 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/09/the-quick-
read-obamas-wars-by-bob-woodward/63586/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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RESERVOIR665 Collection GCHQ’s “Facebook application allowing 
collection of various information.”666 
Status is listed as “[f]ully operational, 
but note operational restrictions.”667 
RETRO668 Collection NSA program under the “voice 
interception program, called MYSTIC, 
[which] began in 2009. Its RETRO tool, 
short for ‘retrospective retrieval,’ and 
related projects reached full capacity 
against the first target nation in 2011.” 
“The call buffer opens a door ‘into the 
past,’ the summary says, enabling users 
to ‘retrieve audio of interest that was not 
tasked at the time of the original call.’ 
Analysts listen to only a fraction of 
1 percent of the calls, but the absolute 
numbers are high. Each month, they 
send millions of voice clippings, or ‘cuts,’ 
for processing and long-term storage.”669 
ROADBED670 Collection Intelligence Analysis Intern used 
BLACKPEARL and “successfully 
located, identified, and submitted 
several new targets.”671 
ROLLINGTHUNDER672 Attack GCHQ program that provides 
“[d]istributed denial of service using 
P2P. Built by ICTR, deployed by 
JTRIG.”673 Status is not listed.674 
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SALVAGERABBIT675 Collection NSA program that “exfiltrates data from 
removable flash drives that connect to an 
infected computer.”676 
SARATOGA677 Unknown NSA/GCHQ joint program listed as 
“coming soon.”678 
SCARLETEMPEROR679 Attack GCHQ program that provides “[t]argeted 
denial of service against targets’ phones 
via call bombing.”680 Status listed as 
“[r]eady to fire.”681 
SCISSORS682 Processing This NSA program “sort[s] data types for 
analysis in NUCLEON (voice), 
PINWALE (video), MAINWAY (call 




Attack GCHQ program that provides “[p]erfect 
spoofing of emails from Blackberry 
targets.”685 Status listed as “[r]eady to 
fire, but see constraints.”686 
SCREAMINGEAGLE687 Processing GCHQ “tool that processes kismet data 
into geolocation information.”688 
SEBACIUM689 Isolation GCHQ’s “ICTR developed system to 
identify P2P file sharing activity of 
intelligence value.”690 The status of this 
program is not listed.691 
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SECONDDATE692 Attack NSA program designed to “”influence 
real-time communications between client 
and server” and to “quietly redirect web-
browsers” to NSA malware servers called 
FOXACID.”693 
SEMESTER694 Isolation NSA program described as “SIGINT 
targeting and reporting system[].”695 
SERPENTSTONGUE696 Isolation GCHQ program “for fax message 
broadcasting to multiple numbers.”697 
Status is listed as “[i]n 
redevelopment.”698 
SFL699 Isolation “The Sigint Forensics Laboratory was 
developed within NSA. It has been 
adapted by JTRIG as its email extraction 
and first-pass analysis of seized media 
solution.”700 
SHADOWCAT701 Collection GCHQ program that allows for “[e]nd to 
[e]nd encrypted access to a VPS over 
SSH using the TOR network.”702 
SHAREDIVISION703 Unknown Listed in NSA documents under “MHS 
has a growing FORNSAT mission.”704 
SHARKFIN705 Collection NSA program that is a 
“high-capacity/high-speed vacuum 
cleaner once called SHARKFIN and 
renamed RC-10, sweeps up all-source 
communications intelligence (COMINT) 
from a variety of communication 
methods and systems.”706 
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SHELLTRUMPET707 Processing NSA program that, on December 31, 
2012, “processed its One Trillionth 
metadata record.”708 SHELLTRUMPET 
“began as a near-real-time 
metadata analyzer . . . for a classic 
collection system.”709 “In its five year 
history, numerous other systems from 
across the Agency have come to use 
SHELLTRUMPET’s processing 
capabilities for performance monitoring 
and other tasks, such as “direct email tip 
alerting.”710 
SHENANIGANS711 Collection NSA program, used by the CIA, that 
“utilizes a pod on aircraft that vacuums 
up massive amounts of data from any 
wireless routers, computers, smart 
phones or other electronic devices that 
are within range.”712 
SILENTMOVIE713 Attack GCHQ program that is used for the 
“[t]argeted denial of service against SSH 
services.”714 Status is listed as “[r]eady to 
fire.”715 
SILVERBLADE716 Collection GCHQ program that provides 
“[r]eporting of extremist material on 
DAILYMOTION.”717 Status is listed as 
“[r]eady to fire.”718 
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SILVERFOX719 Isolation GCHQ program that consists of a “[l]ist 
provided to industry of live extremist 
material files hosted on FFUs720.”721 
Status is listed as “[r]eady to fire.”722 
SILVERLORD723 Attack GCHQ program that provides 
“[d]isruption of video-based websites 
hosting extremist content through 
concerted target discovery and content 
removal.”724 
SILVERSPECTER725 Isolation GCHQ program that “[a]llows batch 
Nmap726 scanning over TOR.”727 This 
program’s status is listed as “[i]n 
development.”728 
SILVERZEPHYR729 Collection NSA program that provides “customers 
with authorized, transit DNR collection. 
SSO is working with the partner to gain 
access to an additional 80Gbs of DNI 
data on their peering network, bundled 
in 10 Gbs increments.”730 
                                                                                                                  
 719. Id. 
 720. See Files for Upload, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Files_for_ 
upload (last visited Nov. 24, 2015) (showing that FFU stands for “Files For Upload” and is 
a part of WikiProject Articles for creation, allowing “unregistered users to add new files to 
Wikipedia with the assistance of experienced Wikipedians”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 721. JTRIG Tools and Techniques, supra note 131. 
 722. Id. 
 723. Id.  
 724. Id. 
 725. Id. 
 726. See Nmap Reference Guide, NMAP.ORG, http://nmap.org/book/man.html#man-
description (last visited Nov. 24, 2015) (“Nmap (‘Network Mapper’) is an open source tool 
for network exploration and security auditing. It was designed to rapidly scan large 
networks, although it works fine against single hosts.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 727. JTRIG Tools and Techniques, supra note 131. 
 728. Id. 
 729. GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 106.  
 730. Id. 
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SKYSCRAPER731 Isolation GCHQ program that provides for the 
“[p]roduction and dissemination of 
multimedia via the web in the course of 
information operations.”732 
SKYWRITER733 Isolation NSA “SIGINT targeting and reporting 
system.”734 
SLAMMER735 Processing GCHQ program that “is a data index and 
repository that provides analysts with 
the ability to query data collected from 
the Internet from various JTRIG 
sources, such as EARTHLING, 
HACIENDA, web pages saved by 
analysis etc.”736 
SLIPSTREAM737 Attack GCHQ program that provides the 
“[a]bility to inflate page views on 
websites.”738 
SMOKEYSINK739 Unknown NSA/GCHQ joint program listed as 
“coming soon.”740 
SNICK741 Unknown NSA program listed under “FORNSAT 
1.”742 
SNOOPY743 Isolation GCHQ “tool to extract mobile phone data 
from a copy of the phone’s memory 
(usually supplied as an image file 
extracted through FTK).”744 
SNORT745 Attack According to Marc Ambinder, this is a 
NSA “[r]epository of computer network 
attack techniques/coding.”746 
                                                                                                                  
 731. Id. 
 732. Id.  
 733. JTRIG Tools and Techniques, supra note 131. 
 734. Id. 
 735. Id. 
 736. Id. 
 737. Id. 
 738. Id.  
 739. The NSA and GCHQ’s QUANTUMTHEORY Hacking Tactics, supra note 298. 
 740. Id. 
 741. Greenwald, supra note 1. 
 742. Id. 
 743. JTRIG Tools and Techniques, supra note 131. 
 744. Id. 
 745. Ambinder, supra note 134; Somerville, supra note 134. 
 746. Id. 
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SODAWATER747 Collection GCHQ program that is “[a] tool for 
regularly downloading gmail messages 
and forwarding them onto CERBERUS 
mailboxes.”748 Status listed as “[f]ully 
[o]perational.”749 
SOMALGET750 Collection NSA program that “used access legally 
obtained in cooperation with the U.S. 
Drug Enforcement Administration to 
open a backdoor to the country’s cellular 
telephone network, enabling it to 
covertly record and store the ‘full-take 
audio’ of every mobile call made to, from 
and within the Bahamas—and to replay 
those calls for up to a month.”751 
SOUNDER752 Unknown NSA program listed under “FORNSAT 
1.”753 
SOUTHWINDS754 Unknown NSA program found in a slide that 
states: “Global coverage via 
SOUTHWINDS is planned in the next 
year.”755 
SPACEROCKET756 Attack GCHQ “programme [sic] covering 
insertion of media into target networks. 
CRINKLE CUT is a tool developed by 
ICTR-CISA to enable JTRIG track 
images as part of SPACE ROCKET.”757 
SPICEISLAND758 Collection GCHQ program that will be “JTRIG’s 
new infrastructure. FOREST WARRIOR, 
FRUITBOWL, JAZZFUSION and other 
JTRIG systems will form part of the 
SPICEISLAND infrastructure.”759 
Status listed as “DEV [development].”760 
                                                                                                                  
 747. JTRIG Tools and Techniques, supra note 131. 
 748. Id. 
 749. Id. 
 750. Devereaux, Greenwald & Poitras, supra note 492. 
 751. Id. 
 752. GREENWALD, supra note 1. 
 753. Id. 
 754. Id. at 165. 
 755. Id. 
 756. JTRIG Tools and Techniques, supra note 131. 
 757. Id. 
 758. Id. 
 759. Id.  
 760. Id. 
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SPINNERET761 Collection “[D]esigned to allow users to view the 
metadata record counts by 
organizational structure all the way 
down to the cover term.”762 
SPRINGBISHOP763 Isolation GCHQ program that can “[f]ind private 
photographs of targets on Facebook.”764 
The status of this program is not 
listed.765 
SPRINGRAY766 Unknown “A notification has been posted to 
SPRINGRAY and this collection is 
available to Second Parties via 
TICKETWINDOW.”767 
SQUEAKYDOLPHIN768 Collection GCHQ tool that collects and analyzes 
data from social media networks.769 
STEALTHMOOSE770 Attack GCHQ “tool that will Disrupt target’s 
Windows machine. Logs of how long and 
when the effect is active.”771 
STELLAR772 Unknown  NSA program that is listed under 
“FORNSAT 1.”773 
STORMBREW774 Collection NSA program that “among others, 
filter[s] and gather[s] information at 
major telecommunications 
companies.”775 
                                                                                                                  
 761. GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 43; BOUNDLESSINFORMANT—Frequently Asked 
Questions (Sept. 6, 2012), https://www.eff.org/files/2014/04/09/20131122-dagbladet-
boundless_informant_faq.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2015) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 762. BOUNDLESSINFORMANT—Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 761. 
 763. GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 43. 
 764. JTRIG Tools and Techniques, supra note 131. 
 765. Id. 
 766. Id.; GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 106. 
 767. Id.  
 768. Richard Esposito et al., Snowden Docs Reveal British Spies Snooped on Youtube 
and Facebook, NBC NEWS (Jan. 27, 2014), http://investigations.nbcnews.com/ 
_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docs-reveal-british-spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-face 
book (last visited Aug. 28, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 769. Id. 
 770. JTRIG Tools and Techniques, supra note 131. 
 771. Id. 
 772. GREENWALD, supra note 1. 
 773. Id. 
 774. Gorman & Valentino-Devries, supra note 199; GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 103. 
 775. Gorman & Valentino-Devries, supra note 199; GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 103. 
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SUNBLOCK776 Attack GCHQ program that provides the 
“[a]bility to deny functionality to 
send/receive email or view material 
online.”777 
SURREY778 Database Marc Ambinder describes this as the 
“[m]ain NSA requirements database, 
where targets and selectors are 
‘validated’ by NSA managers.”779 
SYLVESTER780 Collection GCHQ program that is a “[f]ramework 
for automated interaction/alias 
management on social networks.”781 
SWAMPDONKEY782 Attack A GCHQ “tool that will silently locate all 
predefined types of file and encrypt them 
on a targets [sic] machine.”783 
TANGLEFOOT784 Processing GCHQ “bulk search tool which queries a 
set of online resources. This allows 
analysts to quickly check the online 
presence of a target.”785 
TANNER786 Isolation GCHQ “technical program allowing 
operators to log on to a JTRIG website to 
grab IP addresses of Internet Café’s 
[sic].”787 Status listed as “[r]eplaced by 
HAVOK.”788 
TARMAC789 Unknown NSA program listed in slides under 
“Why TARMAC? . . . MHS has a growing 
FORNSAT 
mission . . . SHAREDIVISION 
mission . . . SigDev (‘Difficult Signals 
collection’).”790 
                                                                                                                  
 776. JTRIG Tools and Techniques, supra note 131. 
 777. Id. 
 778. Ambinder, supra note 134. 
 779. Id.; Somerville, supra note 134. 
 780. JTRIG Tools and Techniques, supra note 131. 
 781. Id. 
 782. Id. 
 783. Id. 
 784. Id. 
 785. Id.  
 786. Id. 
 787. Id.  
 788. Id. 
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TECHNOVIKING791 Collection GCHQ “sub-system of JAZZFUSION.”792 
Listed as “design.”793 
TEMPORA794 Collection GCHQ program that “aims to eventually 
allow the agency (and its partner) to 
survey over 90 percent of the cables that 
route through the United Kingdom, 
pulling data from 400 at once.”795 This 
data can also source from the US and is 
allegedly shared with the NSA.796 
THIEVINGMAGPIE797 Isolation NSA program “using on-board 
GSM/GPRS services to track targets.”798 
TICKETWINDOW799 Unknown Found on NSA slide: “collection is 
available to Second Parties via 
TICKETWINDOW.”800 
TOPHAT801 Isolation GCHQ program that is “[a] version of the 
MUSTANG and DANCING BEAR 
techniques that allows us [GCHQ] to 
pull back Cell Tower and WiFi locations 
targeted against particular areas.”802 
Status is listed as “in development.”803 
TORNADOALLEY804 Attack GCHQ “delivery method (Excel 
Spreadsheet) that can silently extract 
and run an executable on a target’s 
machine.”805 
                                                                                                                  
 791. JTRIG Tools and Techniques, supra note 131. 
 792. Id.  
 793. Id. 
 794. The NSA in Germany: Snowden’s Documents Available for Download, supra note 
122. 
 795. Id.; Philip Bump, The UK Tempora Program Captures Vast Amounts of Data—
and Shares with the NSA, WIRE (June 21, 2013), 
http://www.thewire.com/national/2013/06/uk-tempora-program/66490/ (last visited Nov. 
24, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 796. Bump, supra note 795.  
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TOYGRIPPE806 Database NSA program that is described on a slide 
as a “[f]ull take metadata repository.”807 
TRACERFIRE808 Attack GCHQ program that is “[a]n Office 
Document that grabs the target’s 
Machine info, files, logs, etc and posts it 
back to GCHQ.”809 Status listed as “[i]n 
[d]evelopment.”810 
TRAFFICTHIEF811 Processing NSA program that Marc Ambinder 
describes as a “[r]aw SIGINT viewer for 
data analysis.”812 
TRAILBLAZER813 Collection A failed NSA collection program, 
described as an 
“abandoned . . . $1.2-billion flop.”814 
TREASUREMAP815 Processing NSA program that provides “a near real-
time, interactive map of the global 
Internet” and is a “massive Internet 




“[C]ollection, procession, analysis and 
reporting system.”818 
                                                                                                                  
 806. Bad Guys Are Everywhere, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Sept. 14, 2014), 
http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34757.pdf. 
 807. Id. 
 808. JTRIG Tools and Techniques, supra note 131. 
 809. Id.  
 810. Id. 
 811. Ambinder, supra note 134; Somerville, supra note 134. 
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 813. Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer, THE NEW YORKER (May 23, 2011), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/23/the-secret-sharer (last visited Sept. 20, 
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 814. Id.  
 815. James Risen & Laura Poitras, NSA Report Outlined Goals for More Power, N. Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/us/politics/nsa-report-outlined-
goals-for-more-power.html?_r=0 (last visited Oct. 2, 2015) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 816. Id. 
 817. The NSA in Germany: Snowden’s Documents Available for Download, supra note 
122. 
 818. European Security Center to Begin Operations, AM. C.L. UNION, 
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TROPICPUMA819 Processing A program with “fax processing 
capabilities” that provided “unique and 
valuable intelligence to ESOC and 
BND.”820 
TURBULENCE821 Collection NSA program that “includes nine core 
programs, with intriguing names such as 
Turmoil, Tutelage and Traffic Thief. 
Among their goals: mapping social 
networks based on intercepted 
communications, embedding technology 
on networks to collect data, and 
searching for patterns across hundreds 
of NSA databases.”822 
TURMOIL823 Processing DNI processing system, which has 
evolved “from GRANDMASTER to 
WEALTHYCLUSTER and, in the future, 
TURMOIL”824 
TWILIGHTARROW825 Processing GCHQ program that is a “[r]emote GSM 
secure covert internet proxy using VPN 
services.”826 Status listed as 
“operational.”827 
UNDERPASS828 Attack GCHQ program that allows users to 
“[c]hange outcome[s] of online polls 
(previously known as NUBILO).”829 
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2007), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2007-02-11/news/0702110034_1_turbulence-
cyberspace-nsa/2 (last visited Sept. 20, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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UPSTREAM830 Collection NSA program that provides “Collection 
of communications on fiber cables and 
infrastructure as data flows past.”831 
This includes STROMBREW, 
FAIRVIEW, BLARNEY, and 
OAKSTAR.832 The identities of the four 
U.S. telecom providers that cooperate 
with the NSA are tightly guarded.833 
Reportedly, some 11,000 pieces of 
information come from Blarney every 
year. It is one of the “top sources” for the 
President’s daily brief, a top-secret 
document briefing the president every 
morning on security matters.834 
VAGRANT835 Unknown Bruce Schneier describes this as a 
“[c]ollection of [c]omputer screens.”836 
VIEWER837 Isolation GCHQ “programme that (hopefully) 
provides advance tip off of the 
kidnappers IP address for HMG 
personnel.” Status listed as “operational, 
but awaiting field trial.”838 
VIKINGPILLAGE839 Collection GCHQ “[d]istributed network for the 
automatic collection of 
encrypted/compressed data from 
remotely hosted JTRIG projects.”840 
Status listed as “[o]perational.”841 
                                                                                                                  
 830. GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 108. 
 831. Id.  
 832. Ball, supra note 54. 
 833. Id. 
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VIPERSTONGUE842 Attack GCHQ “tool that will silently Denial of 
Service calls on a Satellite Phone or a 
GSM Phone.”843 
WARPATH844 Attack GCHQ tool that provides for the “[m]ass 
delivery of SMS messages to support an 
Information Operations campaign.”845 
WATCHTOWER846 Collection GCHQ’s “GCNET->CERBERUS Export 
Gateway Interface System.”847 Listed as 
“operational.”848 
WAXTITAN849 Collection Listed in “United Kingdom—Collection 
Information” with Validator ID of 
“610102256.”850 
WEALTHYCLUSTER851 Processing DNI processing system, which has 
evolved “from GRANDMASTER to 
WEALTHYCLUSTER and, in the future, 
TURMOIL.”852 
WEBCANDID853 Unknown NSA codename found “on LinkedIn 
profiles.”854 
WILDCOUGAR855 Collection Listed in “United Kingdom—Collection 
Information” with Validator ID of 
“611001840.”856 
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WINDSTOP857 Collection NSA program described as the “name for 
at least four collection systems that 
depend on trusted ‘2nd Party’ partners 
from Britain, Canada, Australia or New 
Zealand. One WINDSTOP project, with 
the cover name MUSCULAR, is used to 
break into the internal ‘cloud’ networks 
of Google and Yahoo which goes by the 
alphanumeric designator DS-200B.”858 
WIRESHARK859 Attack According to Marc Ambinder, this is a 






Collection NSA program listed as “bringing our 
enterprise one step closer to ‘collecting it 
all.’”862 Listed in the following sentence 
on a NSA slide: “In the future, MSOC 
hopes to expand the number of 
WORDGOPHER platforms to enable 
demodulation of thousands of additional 
low-rate carriers.”863 
WRANGLER864 Database NSA program that is described by Marc 
Ambinder as an “[e]lectronic intelligence 
intercept raw database.”865 
WURLITZER866 Attack GCHQ program used to “[d]istribute a 
file to multiple file hosting websites.”867 
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XKEYSCORE868 Collection NSA program that, according to Marc 
Ambinder, is a “[c]ollection tool for 
international metadata.”869 
“XKEYSCORE is a computer-network 
exploitation system that combines high-
speed filtering with SIGDEV.”870 
“[F]ocused on understanding, creating, 
and implementing discovery 
capabilities.”871 “Through the provision 
of XKEYSCORE, NSA will enable 
Germany to provide unique contribution 
in the form of collection, data 
summaries, and/or finished intelligence 
to the high-priority NSA CT mission.”872 
“XKEYSCORE software from DIRNSA to 
further enable the BfV to achieve its 
mission goal of countering terrorist 
activities in Germany.”873 This program 
has also been used by the GCHQ to 
“access . . . private emails hosted by the 
SIM card and mobile companies’ servers, 
as well as those of major tech 
corporations, including Yahoo and 
Google.”874 
YACHTSHOP875 Collection NSA collection tool for “worldwide 
Internet metadata.”876 
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